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The Ukrainian crisis that has led to an enormous polarization in international relations, creates a 
special context for Russian-speaking minorities abroad. Today’s Russia is claimed not only to send 
weaponry to the conflict zone, but also to undertake an attempt to undermine the stability of the 
West. Russian-speakers living in the Western states are accused of being Moscow's 'fifth column'. 
At the same time, Russian media tell a story of 'aggressive West' that disrespects Moscow's natural 
interests and should be opposed to. The thesis argues that the Russophones in Germany find 
themselves stuck between two discursive formations, and this situation finds its reflection in the 
patterns of self-identification and, therefore, political preferences of the group. 
Based on the poststructuralist understanding of identity, the thesis claims that the identification is 
based on the continuity of discursive acts, with the latter being limited by the existing discursive 
background. Therefore, I study the narratives present in two main sociopolitical spaces that the 
group might belong to – German and Russian, as well as those (re)produced by the group’s 
individual members and communities. The previous background associated with the 1990s-2014 
German representations of the group is taken into consideration, too. I come to the conclusion that 
the group experienced prolonged ‘othering’ from the receiving society, which pushed them to the 
edge of political spectrum. Furthermore, the massive 'integrationist' stigmatization has led to 
internal divisions within the group. 
Throughout the research, it has become clear that the Ukrainian crisis has not changed the previous 
tendencies. Despite the initial signs of (limited) unification, the internal differences laid during the 
previous periods were not overcome. In this sense, the accusations of Russophones’ being an 
instrument of Russian policy have proved to be false. 
Key words: Russian-speakers, Germany, identity, poststructuralism, Laclau and Mouffe, Ukrainian 
crisis 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background to the research problem 
The Ukrainian crisis has marked a very special shift in international relations. In 2014 General Phil 
Breedlove, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe described Russia as waging “the most 
amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of information warfare” 
(cit.ex.: McIntosh 2015 : 299-300). Today’s Russia is often claimed not only to send weaponry to 
conflict zones, but also to undertake an attempt to shake the stability of the West through the means 
propaganda. The narrative of a reciprocal Western information warfare can also be traced in Russian 
public sphere (Strategiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii 2015). 
Growing tensions place Russophonic communities abroad in a very specific position of alleged 
‘Kremlin’s agents’. TIME's columnist Shuster (2014) argues that Russia is fighting for the allegiance 
of Russophones in order to create a 'fifth column' in the neighboring states, and the 2014 events are 
associated with an intensification of such activities. He emphasizes that Russophones in the Baltic 
states tend to read Russian mass-media – and this fact is skillfully used for the aims of propaganda. 
Shuster’s approach makes an accent on the role of media in constructing a difference between Russian-
speaking population and the native population of Baltic states. According to his logic, this artificially 
exaggerated dissimilarity might help Moscow pursue an aggressive policy in the region, as it 
previously happened in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. 
Although the Russophones in Germany can hardly be argued to support separatism, the recent years 
have seen them being accused of failing to integrate into the German society and turning into an 
instrument of Russian propaganda (cf. Zeit online 2016, Kamatozov 2017). At the same time, 
mainstream Russophonic media came up with a campaign of ‘protecting the truth’ that more or less 
explicitly refers to former compatriots as potential allies (see more: Russian media & the Ukrainian 
conflict). As a result, the pre-existing differences between the Russophonic community and the 
Germany society are further politicized. The thesis argues that the group finds itself stuck between two 
discursive formations, and this situation might find its reflection in patterns of self-identification and, 
therefore, political preferences. 
1.2 Theoretical framework 
While selecting the theoretic approach, I generally had to choose between two ones (as the concept of 
identity is only given attention by a limited number of schools in IR): constructivism and post-
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structuralism. My giving preference to the poststructuralist approach was based on its concentration on 
non-state actors, its specific shift from 'self-other' to 'self-order' relations and an interestingly designed 
discourse analysis perspective. Among the works of the poststructuralist scholars, I selected the 
research conducted by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe that is consonant with my own views of 
political problematique. Furthermore, I felt myself attracted by Laclau's understanding of populism 
that, from my point of view, can be projected on the processes of identification among immigrant 
marginalized groups (with Russophones in Germany making no exception). 
The poststructuralist theoretic framework claims that the production and circulation of signs constitute 
the social world. The authors who apply this approach for their research give special attention to 
discourses, i.e. "systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of action, beliefs and 
practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they speak” (Lessa 2006 : 
285). The key concepts that define the poststructuralist approach (in its variation represented by the 
works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe) are a nodal point, an empty signifier and identity. Thus, 
a nodal point is defined as a "privileged sign around which the other signs [get] ordered" and, therefore 
acquire their specific meanings. (Jorgensen&Phillips : 26). Within the sphere of IR such concepts as 
democracy or human rights might function as nodal points that create their own co-ordinate systems in 
liberal discourses. The same would be true for national interests within realist discursive practices. 
An empty signifier is, strictly speaking, understood as "a signifier without a signified" (Laclau 2007 : 
36). When it comes to a certain quilting point, it is often claimed to be empty inasmuch as its function 
of representing the universality of an equivalence chain (i.e. the cluster of signs) prevails over that of 
expressing a particular meaning. Moreover, some terms (e.g. justice, freedom, equality) normally 
function as empty signifiers, as their semantic role doesn't consist in expressing any positive content. 
What they do instead is incarnating an absent fullness (Laclau 2005). 
Identity, the last of the key concepts outlining the approach of Laclau and Mouffe, is not defined by 
authors in a direct way. However, several main notions specifying their understanding can be 
formulated. First, identities (as well as meanings in general) are socially constructed on the basis of the 
ongoing language use i.e. discursive practices. Secondly, identities are flexible and never completely 
fixed. Thirdly, there are no objective laws that divide society into particular group, which makes every 
individual type of identification as 'natural', as all others. Returning back to the above-mentioned 
concepts, one can describe identity as a shared notion of equivalence, a plurality of ties between the 
actors that is established and re-established through discursive acts. 
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1.3 Research gap 
As the literature review, conducted within the current research, has demonstrated, most studies devoted 
to the Russophones in Germany are concentrating either on the Russlanddeutsche (e.g. Strobl 2006, 
Worbs et.al. 2013, Rabkov 2006, Kiehl 2009) or on the Russophonic Jews (e.g. Isurin 2011, Roberman 
2014, Kessler 2003, Körber 2005). Comparative studies that might include the category of other 
Russophones are less common and are usually carried out by Russophonic scholars (Verschinin 2011, 
Polyan 2004). Meanwhile, de-naturalizing the divisions between the groups that are dominant within 
the German academia might be of interest when new strategies of working with the group are looked 
for.  
Furthermore, the analysis of previous research found out that the textuality of the Russophones’ own 
media was only given little attention to. Most authors (cf. Smolyarova 2012, Kurennoi 2005) evaluate 
the corresponding media through the dichotomy of professional/amateurish. Hence, the media are 
represented as more or less effectively reflecting the 'objectively existing' social reality, not 
participating in its active construction. The issues of mainstream media influencing immigrants seems 
to be more elaborated within the German academia (e.g. Zinn-Thomas 2006). Here making the focus 
on the Ukrainian crisis seems to be a logical next step in studying the media effects, as these events 
have created a situation when the discursive formations, influencing the Russophones' identities, found 
themselves in a direct conflict. 
My own research is not aimed at either making a detailed analysis of all the Russophones mass media, 
or labeling any representations of the Ukrainian events as ‘corresponding to the facts’. In this case, the 
Ukrainian conflict functions as a research framework (as the identities are context-bound and cannot 
be described without such a limitation), while the reference to the mass media is made to trace both the 
dominant and challenging discourses. 
1.4 Research questions 
The chosen analytical basis brings me to an important presupposition that channels my research. Thus, 
I believe that there are no ‘naturally pre-existing’ relations between Russophones in Germany, as well 
as between them and the state they come from/they live in. All the types of ties are being constantly 
constructed by discursive practices that define ‘we-ness’ and exclude ‘otherness’. Inasmuch as the 
identification processes are defined by the existing discursive background, I put myself a task of 
outlining the discourses dominating in sociopolitical spaces the group finds itself in. Within the 
framework of the current research I assume that Russophonic and German media discourses play the 
key role in the identity construction of the group. However, I fully realize that the group is also 
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influenced by other discourses formulated at national (e.g. within other post-Soviet states), 
supranational and global levels. 
According to my supposition, against the background where previously co-existing national discursive 
formations come in a direct conflict, the group might either (1) experience growing identification with 
one of the sides, or (2) face internal divisions and general marginalization. Therefore, finding out 
whether any of the options functions as a legitimate one becomes my key research question. 
Additional research questions can be formulated as follows: 
a) What kinds of identities do German media discourses referring to the Ukrainian events 
prescribe to Germans? Russians? Russophones? 
b) What kinds of identities do Russian media discourses referring to the Ukrainian events 
prescribe to the above-mentioned groups? 
c) What understandings dominate within the Russophonic community in Germany and how do 
they correlate with the main media discourses? 
d) Is it possible to say that the Ukrainian crisis has become a point that marks a shift in the 
group’s identification processes? If it is, what influence has it exerted? 
Analyzing the tendencies of immigrants’ identification within the discipline of IR might have several 
implications for political practice. On the one hand, it deals with the tasks normally interpreted as 
belonging to domestic politics: i.e. the strategies of working with immigrant communities that help to 
avoid their radicalization. On the other hand, this kind of research might be helpful for governments 
working with the former compatriots living abroad. Finding the right instruments increases the chances 
of receiving more favorable political choices and avoiding the marginalization of the group. One of the 
main presuppositions of my research here deals with the notion of domestic and foreign politics being 
interpenetrative. Furthermore, I demonstrate that the sphere of political has flexible borders, which lets 
lifestyle choices be politicized and both national and international levels. 
1.5 Data & Method 
The research material is represented by diverse types of data: (1) 15 in-depth interviews with the 
representatives of the group and (2) material of the mass communication. The interviews were 
conducted between September 2016 and April 2017 via Skype. All the interviewees were given 
pseudonyms to protect their identities. The recruitment of the interviewees followed several tracks: 
thus, some of them were found through the group's online communities, while others were attracted on 
the basis of the 'snowballing' method or personal ties of the researcher.  
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The mass communication analysis was conducted with the use of three main categories of media: (1) 
German media; (2) Russian media; (3) Russophonic media published in Germany. Thus, such material 
included online and printed articles, TV items, blog posts and comments. The selection of mass media 
was primarily based on quantitative indices; at the same time, both mainstream and strong oppositional 
discourses are represented within the current research. 
The material was processed on the basis of discourse analysis techniques suggested by Ernesto Laclau 
and Chantal Mouffe, as well as their colleagues (cf. Wodak et al. 2009) that concentrate on the use of 
lexical units and syntactic devices. Such discursive instruments included, for instance, personal 
pronouns, temporal references and dichotomies.  
1.6 Thesis structure 
In view of the formulated research questions, the study is divided into six main sections: Introduction, 
Research background & Literature review, Theoretical Framework, Data & Method, Analysis and 
Conclusion. Chapter 1 (Russophones in Germany, media & the Ukrainian conflict) outlines refers to 
the general characteristic of the group, makes a critical review of the literature dealing with similar 
topics and outlines the place of the current research among other studies. Chapter 2 (Theoretical & 
Methodological Framework) consists of three subsections and embraces the principal theoretical 
presuppositions of my research; specifies the key characteristics of poststructuralist approach and 
expands such concepts as discourse, identity, nodal point and empty signifier. The last subsection of 
the chapter refers to discourse analysis as theory and method in its variation elaborated by Ernesto 
Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. Chapter 3 (Method of data collection) describes the specific 
characteristics of an interview as a method of data collection and comments on the choice of mass 
media research data. Chapter 4 (Russophones in Germany: tendencies of identity construction) is 
divided into four main subsections. The first one describes the patterns of identification that were 
formed between the early 1990s and 2014. The second subsection (which also has a composite 
structure) is devoted to the discursive background constituted within Russian and German 
sociopolitical spaces. Thus, both dominating and strong oppositional discourses are mentioned. The 
third subsection of the analytical chapter refers to the influence that the dominant representations of 
the Ukrainian conflict have exerted on the Russophonic community. Finally, the ‘Discussion’ 
subsection specifies the contribution of my conclusions to the general discussion outlined in Chapter 1. 
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2. RUSSOPHONES IN GERMANY, MEDIA & THE UKRAINIAN CONFLICT 
 
The following chapter both studies the general background of the analyzed group and the ways it was 
referred to by scholars. The main accent herein is made on the compound character of the Russophonic 
community that embraces several main groups primarily defined on the basis of formal ethnic 
belongings. Although an overwhelming majority of previous research concentrates on an individual 
subgroup and/or characterizes the community's own media through the dichotomy of 
professional/amateurish (i.e. underestimates their constitutive role), several works that resonate with 
my own conclusions were found, too. Thus, I would like to especially emphasize the research of 
Savoskul (2006) who draws parallels between the concept of integration and immigrants' self-
identification; Verschinin (2011) who demonstrates that the problem of isolation is something that 
different subgroups of Russophones do face in a similar way; and Zinn-Thomas (2006) who argues 
that specific representations of Russophones in mass media influence their life tracks. Furthermore, the 
chapter explains why the Ukrainian crisis might make a suitable background to study Russophones’ 
identities. 
2.1 Russophones in Germany: general characteristics & previous research 
The group of the Russophones in Germany quite rarely appears in literature as a whole. Scholars 
normally distinguish between three main subgroups within the Russophonic community of Germany: 
(1) repatriates (also referred to as Russlanddeutsche, Spätaussiedler); (2) Russian-speaking Jews; (3) 
ethnic Russians and other Russophones. Individual authors tend to concentrate on separate groups that 
are sometimes analyzed in comparison with similar collectives living in other countries.  
This comparative strategy is often applied when the identities of the Russian-speaking Jews are 
studied. For instance, Isurin (2011) inquiries into the peculiarities of the linguistic constructions 
applied by Russian-speaking Jews living in the USA, Germany and Israel. It should be specially 
mentioned that referring to this group Isurin recurrently uses the signifier ‘Russians’ and even the title 
of her book includes the construction 'Russian diaspora'. Furthermore, she treats certain characteristics 
shared by the representatives of the group as a consequence of their being brought up in the Russian 
culture (e.g. special perception of friendship or the prevalence of collectivism over individualism in 
behavior patterns). At the same time, Isurin seems to concentrate on ‘Russianness’ and ignore the 
category of ‘Sovietness’. Thus, the adjective ‘Soviet’ only appears when legal practices (such as 
restrictions on Jewish emigration) are described; moreover, the author emphasizes that the respondents 
she worked with, demonstrate no negativity towards Russia or Russian people in general, but 
sometimes express 'a strong sense of hatred' towards ‘the Soviet communist system’ (ibidem : 197). 
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The productive power of Soviet practices vis-à-vis the respondents’ identity formation is, thus, left 
outside the research framework. 
The idea that the 'Jewishness' of the Russian-speaking Jews in Germany is constructed, can also be 
found in the work of Sveta Roberman (2014). Unlike Isurin, Roberman is quite careful with using the 
adjective ‘Russian’ and prefers ‘Soviet’ and ‘Russian-speaking’ instead. Nevertheless, similarly to her 
colleague, she writes that the Jews who came to Germany from the ex-Soviet Union sometimes didn't 
realize that being Jewish was a critical component of their 'migration contract'. Roberman defines 
'Jewishness' as an empty signifier that was filled up with different content in the Soviet Union and in 
post-Cold War Germany. Thus, in the Soviet Union the concept of 'Jewishness' was based on one's 
origin and disappeared from the public space. The German perception implied that Jews were expected 
to follow their identity through both religious and civic practices. (ibidem : 201-204) 
The largest group of research devoted to the Russophones in Germany concentrates on the repatriates. 
A logical question is: what makes this group such an attractive object of study? First, the repatriation 
of the Spätaussiedler (‘late returnees’, as their status was defined by the Bundesvertriebenengesetz – 
Federal Law on Refugees and Exiles) constituted a very specific case of immigration from the legal 
point of view. The original 1953 law defines an expellee as a German citizen or an ethnic German who 
resided in the former Eastern territories of the German Reich, “temporarily located under foreign 
administration”, or in areas outside the German Reich as of 31 December 1937, and who as a result of 
the World War II events suffered expulsion, in particular through deportation or escape. The amended 
law entitles to the German citizenship those citizens of the ex-communist states, who themselves – or 
whose ancestors – were persecuted or discriminated between 1945 and 1990 for their German or 
alleged German ethnicity by the governments of the respective states (Gesetz über die 
Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge). It implies that soon after the naturalization 
Spätaussiedler would be reflected as Germans (or ‘citizens with migration experience’) in the state 
statistics and treated as such.   
In 1997 a further amendment was made that introduced a proof of language proficiency as a 
precondition to being granted an access to the German citizenship. However, the test was only made 
obligatory for Spätaussiedler, while their accompanying spouses and children were not expected to 
pass it. This point once again emphasized the difference constructed between foreigners and repatriates 
in the German legislation. Thus, the term ‘foreigners’ (Ausländer) as defined by the Foreigners Act of 
9 July 1990 embraced all the categories of people who were neither citizens nor the members of the 
German people (labor migrants, EU citizens, remote kinsmen of the Aussiedler or their spouses 
married for less than 3 years etc.). Spätaussiedler had several ‘privilege’ unique among the immigrant 
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groups. For instance, repatriates were entitled to attend German language courses for up to 6 months 
and receive integration benefits for a 10-month period, indexed according to their needs. 
Spätaussiedler from the ex-Soviet Union could also receive special tax reductions, assistance in 
realizing educational or employment opportunities and the right to unemployment benefits and 
pensions as if they had worked and lived in the FRG for their entire lives. On the contrary, the first 
integration programs for foreigners were established in 2004 when the new Immigration Law was 
passed. Interestingly, it was the same law that introduced an obligatory language proficiency test for 
the Spätaussiedler family member as a prerequisite to their access to the German territory. (Takle 2011 
: 171-176) 
Secondly, repatriates can be defined a specific group of the Russophones. The duality of their status is 
reflected even in the term ‘Russlanddeutsche’ (Russian German) applied in German to describe the 
group. Groenendijk (1997 : 473) writes that in everyday life the repatriates are sometimes simply 
referred to as ‘Russkis’ (Russians). At the same time, the official documents might put the 
Spätaussiedler into the category of Germans – which leads to the situations similar to that described by 
Ayse Caglar.  She writes that there were cases when young repatriates with poor knowledge of 
German language constituted a greater part of school classes – but still didn't break the established 
quotas of foreigners – thereby leading to worse results for the whole classes (2001 : 344). 
Whereas the Russian-speaking Jews coming to Germany were invited to be different and reproduce 
their specific forms of behavior (although to a certain extent external and foreign to them), the 
repatriates were expected to dissolve in the German society. In the 1990s the project of ‘integration’, 
which in fact was based on the concept of assimilation, faced multiple difficulties. A research 
conducted by the Bielefeld University between November 1998 and February 1999 in schools where 
young repatriates studied, indicated that 69,7% of the newcomers could hardly read German texts. 
61,5% of the interviewed were almost exclusively incorporated into Spätaussiedler social networks. 
(Strobl 2006 : 95-97)  
Working with the issues of repatriates’ integration, scholars couldn’t avoid directing their attention to 
‘formal’ failures and their ‘objective’ reasons. Quite logically, the most large-scale state-sponsored 
research of the recent years, devoted to the Russophones in Germany, was that concentrating on the 
adaptation of the Russlanddeutsche. The 2013 report (Spät-)Aussiedler in Deutschland Worbs et. al. 
outlines the main sociodemographic characteristics of the group concerned. The authors find out some 
differences between the German and the repatriates' lifestyles. Thus, they write that the percentage of 
marriages and number of kids in the Spätaussiedler families are both higher than among the Germans 
without migration experience. (Worbs et. al. 2013 : 38-44) Special attention in the report is given to 
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the education indictors among the representatives of the group. Unlike in the late 1990s, in 2013 81% 
of the Spätaussiedler and 99% of their children claim to speak either good or very good German 
(ibidem : 142-143). Summarizing several individual indices (e.g. the share of adults without school 
education or the share of children attending Gymnasien – the most advanced of the three types of 
German secondary schools), the scholars come to the conclusion that the results among the repatriates 
are worse than among the Germans without migration experience, but still not the worst among the 
immigrant groups (ibidem : 49-50). 
However, not only those working under the auspices of the state structures introduce an implicit “Who 
is guilty that the assimilation wasn’t successful?” question into their analysis. Rabkov (2006 : 323) 
mentions several integration obstacles described by her colleagues: cultural differences between the 
sending and the receiving societies, lack of linguistic competences among immigrants, absence of 
‘democratic uprising’ in the ex-communist states, absence of previous contacts with the receiving 
society etc.  
Another cluster of works is devoted to the personal experiences of the returnees and their possible 
tracks of ‘integration’. These studies are usually on some interview material; a good example can be 
found in Svetlana Kiehl's Wie deutsch sind Russlanddeutsche? (To which extent are Russian Germans 
German?). Kiehl specially emphasizes that the migrants' identities are a product of social construction. 
After holding a set of interviews, she comes to the conclusion that successful integration is only 
possible in the cases when a repatriate has a positive perception of his or her “ethno-cultural 
belonging”. At the same time, Kiehl writes that those having a negative perception tend to “invent a 
victim role”, i.e. to make the fact that their ancestors suffered expulsion, an important element of self-
identification. Such a behavior is stigmatized by the scholar as non-integrationist (Kiehl 2009 : 182-
189). Thus, when describing the lifestyles of Spätaussiedler, Svetlana Kiehl, in fact, reproduces the 
specific understandings of being a ‘good’ and a ‘bad’ repatriate, which became dominating in the 
German society of the 1990s.  
The phenomena of internal splits between more and less 'integrated' Russlanddeutsche also appears in 
Maria Savoskul's Russlanddeutsche in Germany: integration and types of self-identification. Savokul 
(2006) describes three main categories of identification among the Spätaussiedler: (1) purely German 
self-identification, associated with successful integration and active civic participation; (2) dual 
identification associated with integration through the cultural pluralism; (3) crisis of identification, 
understood as an inability to build into either German or Russian social structures. Although the author 
tries to avoid obvious stigmatizing, several facts do indicate that a ‘good-bad’ repatriate scale is still 
present in her work. First, there’s a general impression that the boundaries of the groups are relatively 
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stable, and it depends upon the initial perception of the repatriate’s position by him- or herself, whether 
he or she would belong to a concrete group. Secondly, the strict connection between self-identification 
and integration seems to be undertheorized. Savoskul makes an attempt to critically analyze the 
concept of integration, however, the identification component is approached to in a quite automatic 
way. Third, the images of the group representatives look quite stereotypic. For instance, those having 
an identification crisis are portrayed as those having a poor education and working on temporary low-
paid jobs. Thus, an idea is promoted that being in the process of identification transit is deviant and 
inevitably leads to social exclusion. 
Critical voices do sound among those who study the Spätaussiedler group, too. Rabkov criticizes the 
concept of integration that implies that the [German] social system with its specific culture and 
structure finds itself in a condition of balance. The arrival of immigrants, she argues, is thought to 
destroy the balance, and their successful integration – to restore it back. According to Rabkov (2006 : 
324), this kind of thinking leaves outside the brackets the mechanisms that lead to the construction of 
social boundaries. However, when it comes to empirical analysis, the dominant perceptions remain 
unchallenged: differences are perceived as objectively pre-determined, not as existing within a specific 
discursive terrain. 
From my point of view, cross-group studies that include different categories of the German 
Russophones have a greater potential. First of all, this is the only type of studies that pays attention to 
the existence of the third group – i.e. ‘ethnic Russians and other Russophones’. In the early 2000s 
Pavel Polyan (2004) estimated the total number of the group members at 400,000 people, however, 
most one-category researchers totally ignore their voices. Secondly, only the scholars working with the 
Russophones in general might observe how both the commonness and difference between the above-
mentioned categories are socially constructed. Thus, I have previously mentioned the recurrent theses 
that the ‘Jewishness’ of the Kontingentflüchtlinge and the ‘Germaneness’ of the Russlanddeutsche are 
not natural, but get constituted as a result of specific social, political and linguistic practices. Cross-
group studies open the space for comparative strategies (cf. Baerwolf 2006) and demonstrate how the 
former compatriots follow the discursively inscribed identities, and internal boundaries are being 
constructed. An interesting example of such a work is Sergei Verschinin's article devoted to the issues 
of identification of the Russian-speaking migrants in Germany. Thus, he comes to the conclusion that 
different groups of the Russophones might have diverging socioeconomic characteristic, but the 
isolationism, typical of the minority in general, is to a certain extent stimulated by the milieu (2011 : 
59). 
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For the aims of my research, I find it reasonable to follow a cross-group approach, too. Such a decision 
is based on both the focus on media discourses and the choice of linguistic commonality as a 
characteristic that unites the otherwise heterogeneous group. Hence, I make an assumption that the 
representatives of all the three subgroups are subject to German and Russophonic media discourses at 
the same time. 
2.2 Russophones & media: previous research 
Although the mass media function as a source of data, not a research object of my analysis, I find it 
vital to add some general characteristics of media studies. Such a step is designed to place my work on 
the map of the previous research and reinforce the specific understandings of media influence that I 
share. Furthermore, research on ethnic media is added, as the latter demonstrates some characteristics 
that distinguish it from other studies of the Russophonic community. For instance, this type of research 
gravitates to cross-group studies (which corroborates my own choice) and feels more comfortable with 
non-ethnic adjectives (Soviet, post-Soviet, coming from the CIS space etc.). 
Since the early 20th century there exists a broad consensus among Western scholars that the mass 
media exercise a great influence on social life. However, the concrete ways of approaching this 
influence have changed. Whereas in the interwar period mass media were generally understood as an 
instrument of propaganda attacking defenseless audience, the academia of the 1950s came up with a 
model representing the society as a honeycomb of small groups, where individual ties shielded the 
group members from the media influence. During the late 1960s and 1970s this model was challenged 
by both neo-Marxists, who argued that their predecessors paid little attention to the role of media in 
maintaining class domination, and the so-called ‘new look’ researchers, who demonstrated that the 
mass media shouldn’t be underestimated against the changing political and communication 
background (weak partisanship, higher voter volatility rates, increasing importance of television as a 
medium of political communication). (Curran et. al 2005 : 6-9; Blumler & Gurevitch 2005 : 241-243) 
Within the framework of the current study, it seems especially important to emphasize that the 1970s 
research finally brought the text into the focus of academic attention. Previously the researchers of 
mass communications worked with rather abstract models of media influence on audiences. The 
second half of the 1970s opened a way for a systematic account of media discourse, introducing the 
concepts of ideology and hegemony into the mass communication studies (van Dijk 1985 : 3). In 1980 
Stuart Hall, one of the key theorists of the new wave, defined media as a “major cultural and 
ideological force, standing in a dominant position with respect to the way in which social relations and 
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political problems were defined and the production and transformation of popular ideologies in the 
audience addressed” (cit. ex.: ibidem). 
Multiple understandings elaborated in this period – with Hall’s one making no exception – seem to be 
based on the Gramscian heritage. Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist who wrote in the 1920s and 
1930s, argued that the power of the dominant groups is based on both coercion and consent. The latter 
is thought to be established at the level of ideological domination, when the modes of thinking of the 
ruling groups are transmitted by intellectuals and thereby transformed into the commonsense 
assumptions (Croteau. Hoynes & Milan s.a. : 159-160). Reinterpreting mass media as an instrument of 
hegemony in the second half of the 20th century was an act of bringing in the political in its broad 
sense. Using the words of Fairclough (1995 : 2), this turn demonstrated that mass media have a 
“signifying power” (i.e. the power to represent events in a particular way). Similar idea runs through 
the works of Mouffe who prefers regarding mass media as one of the fields where hegemony is created 
and reproduced, but also can be challenged (Carpentier & Cammaerts 2006 : 969).  
Whereas the media research in general experiences a radical breakthrough in the 1970s, the branch 
dealing with ethnic media remained rather marginalized. According to Oh (2016 : 264-266), the first 
attempt to theorize on the role played by the ethnic media in the lives of immigrants was made in 1922 
by Robert Park. This research has become fundamental in the sense that it had been almost exclusively 
structuring the academic perceptions of ethnic media for 70 years, and still keeps the role of a 
meaningful background taken into consideration by scholars. Park’s approach, known as ‘assimilation-
pluralism’ paradigm, consisted in analyzing the ethnic press through the question of whether it slowed 
the immigrants from assimilation into the dominant society (pluralism), or facilitated their 
assimilation. In some way, this approach resonates with the later studies of migrants’ civic 
organizations made by German sociologists several decades later. Thus, in the 1980s Germany 
witnessed so-called 'Elwert-Esser debates'. Whereas Elwert came up with a thesis of 
'Binnenintegration' (inner integration) that implied a positive influence of migrants' own organizations 
on their integration into the receiving society, his colleague Esser insisted that the establishment of 
such organizations can lead to the formation of a 'parallel society' (Elwert 1982, Esser 1986). 
Dichotomies similar to those described by Park appear in contemporary studies, too. Thus, Georgiou 
(2003) applies the conceptual pair of inclusion/diversity, while Elias and Lemish (2011) distinguish 
between ‘inward’ integration (preservation of the group unity and its specific cultural characteristics) 
and ‘outward’ integration (adaptation to the receiving society). At some point this ‘re-branding’ might 
be useful, as it helps to bypass the specific connotation associated with individual concepts. However, 
an important observation was made by Oh: in each conceptual pair one side is more or less explicitly 
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defined as preferable. This process of putting two concepts into specific relations of power might 
influence the researchers. For instance, Park worked in the period when assimilation was understood as 
a positive social outcome – and his research underpinned the thesis that ethnic press was more 
assimilationist than pluralistic. On the contrary, contemporary Western scholars tend to evaluate 
multiculturalism as a preferable outcome – as a result, the pluralistic role of ethnic media is applauded 
(Oh 2016 : 265).  
The aim of overcoming the ‘assimilation-pluralism’ approach to ethnic media implies changing the 
focus of research from their audiences to the texts (i.e. discourses) produced by them. Nevertheless, 
most studies devoted to the Russophones in Germany don’t try to challenge the dominating paradigm. 
For instance, Elias and Lemish (2011 : 1266-1268) perform a comparative analysis of the media use 
among Russian-speaking immigrants in Israel and Germany. The conclusion they come to can be 
characterized as a classic ‘assimilation-pluralism’ thesis: thus, they argue that three kinds of media 
(host, homeland and global) can be classified according to their contribution to either to the 
preservation of a shared language and family consolidation (‘inward’ integration), or to the 
incorporation into the host society (‘outward’ integration). Similar to her Israeli colleagues, Russian 
scholar Smolyarova (2012) distinguishes between ‘integrating’ and ‘isolating’ media. Following the 
ideas of Park, she mentions several functions performed by the ethnic media: orientation of immigrants 
in the host society, formation of common media-space, consolidation of the immigrant group. The 
place of a concrete periodical on the assimilation-pluralism scale is, thus, defined on the basis of its 
dominating functions. 
The thesis of media playing a constitutive role remains underrepresented; most authors refer to the 
mass media as a mirror that (sometimes ineffectively) reflects the already existing state of affairs. As a 
result, ethnic media are criticized for being 'amateurish' and 'unprofessional' (cf. Smolyarova 2012, 
Kurennoi 2005), i.e. representing the social reality in an ineffective way. Even in cases when the final 
aim is defined as analyzing the identity issues (as it was made by Pfetsch, 1999), the role of media 
might be reduced to addressing the problems of belonging, not shaping them.  
Meanwhile, the media in general demonstrate a great constitutive potential, when it comes to 
ethnically/culturally specific communities. In their cross-border study of migrants' media 
representations Gemi, Ulasiuk and Triandafyllidou (2013) argue that the mainstream media cover 
immigration in a very specific way. For instance, news on ethnic minorities are only gathered when 
something sensational happens; more attention is given to negative news and emotion-laden stories. 
The scholars don’t go as far as to give a theoretic interpretation to these facts from the point of view of 
the political science, however, they describe at least one example of a media-constructed behavior. 
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They write that migrants tend to avoid media attention, when their previous experience demonstrates 
that a negative representation is inevitable (ibidem : 277). A more complicated story is scrutinized by 
Zinn-Thomas (2006). She argues that German mass-media create a negative image of Spätaussiedler 
(they are represented as a criminal non-integrating community that wastes the state budgets) – as a 
result, a social distance between the native population and the repatriates is growing. Young 
immigrants, Zinn-Thomas claims, are often experiencing some kind of social exclusion, or find 
themselves stigmatized as ‘criminals’ – a characteristic that influences their life tracks.  
So far, the researchers dealing with the Russian-speaking community have paid little attention to the 
new media. Thus, Kurennoi (2005 : 8) only gives a short formal description of a single ethnic web-site 
(germany.ru). The same web-site is mentioned by Androutsopoulos (2006) who makes a comparative 
study of diasporic media communities in Germany. Although the conclusions that he makes on the 
connection of those media with identification processes might be relevant within the current research, 
the Russophonic material doesn’t seem to be the key basis of research, giving place to Persian and 
Greek web-sites. Kissau (2008 : 31-32) analyzes the strategies of using Internet among different 
groups of migrants and argues that those coming from Russia are especially interested in surfing local 
information web-sites, and prefer establishing online contacts with their former compatriots, rather 
than native Germans. However, the information provided by Kissau and her colleagues can already be 
called outdated, as it doesn’t take into consideration the recent development of Internet media. The 
most up-to-date analysis of Russophonic media use in Germany can be found in 2016 Rusmedia Group 
market report that gives a detailed characteristic of audiences, but, quite logically, leaves the textual 
content of media outside its framework (Mediadaten 2016: Russische Medien in Deutschland). 
Meanwhile, the effects of the user generated contents' gaining more weight in the media space 
shouldn't be underestimated. Whereas the 'traditional' mass media are based on a strict distinction 
between professional journalists and audiences, new media seem to have broken this boundary. The 
communication flows stop being unidirectional; those who were previously defined as listeners now 
participate in the production of media discourses. (Croteau, Hoynes & Milan s.a : 135-136). 
Furthermore, time gaps between events and their media interpretations grow shorter; messages are 
easier transmitted to larger audiences all over the world. Local voices previously absent from the 
global media sphere, are becoming visible. Those dramatic changes initiated new debates in academia. 
Some of the authors concentrated on the potential of the new mass media in inducing social 
disturbance (Abbott 2013), others concentrated on how the very character of news is changing 
(Croteau, Hoynes & Milan s.a : 137-138), or whether using the new media can be interpreted as 
realizing direct democracy (Carpentier & Cammaerts 2006 : 969-970). For the aims of the current 
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research, I would follow the track outlined by Chantal Mouffe in her 2006 interview (ibidem). Mouffe 
argues that new media share the main characteristic of traditional mass communication: they 
discursively reproduce hegemony, but also have a counter-hegemonic potential. Inasmuch as my 
research aims are connected the textuality of mass media, I would only give little attention to the 
‘objective’ characteristics of their audiences, as well academic debates on the media ‘revolutions’. 
2.3 Mid-2010s Ukrainian conflict as a special case 
One of the key presuppositions of the current research is that identities are flexible and undergo a 
persistent process of discursive construction (see: The concept of identity in international relations). 
Such an approach implies that a researcher is unable to describe a context-traversing collective 
identity; what is made instead can be characterized as outlining a limited plurality of identities. The 
limits of a concrete plurality are not predefined by any ‘natural’ factors, and get defined by a scholar 
on the basis of his or her research aims. 
When it comes to analyzing the identities of the Russophones in Germany, the mid-2010s Ukrainian 
conflict seems to make a suitable background. Whenever the academia interprets the crisis as a logical 
next step in worsening EU-Russia relations (e.g. Feklyunina 2015) or an outcome that could’ve been 
avoided (e.g. Forsberg & Haukkala 2016), the Ukrainian events are generally represented as a situation 
when diverging narratives turned into conflicting ones. Especially challenging the situation becomes 
for those groups whose identities used to be constructed by both discursive terrains.  
For instance, analyzing the Ukrainian state identity, Feklyunina (2015) demonstrates that before 2014 
the county’s sociopolitical space was dominated by three discursive modes: (1) Ukraine as a part of 
‘Russkii mir’ (Russian world); (2) Ukraine as a part of Europe; (3) Ukraine as alternative Europe with 
traditional values. Almost the same story is told by scholars working with Russophonic minorities – 
with Russophones in Germany making no exception. The very titles of the above-mentioned works 
(e.g. 'Zuhause fremd – Russlanddeutsche zwischen Russland und Deutschland' <Alien at home - 
Russian Germans between Russia and Germany], '"In Russia we were Germans, and now we are 
Russians." - Dilemmas of identity formation and communication among German-Russian Aussiedler', 
'Wie deutsch sind Russlanddeutsche?' <To which extent are Russlanddeutsche German?]) indicate a 
specific status that members of the group have. Scholars describe different ethnic, linguistic, religious 
identities – as well as those transcending individual categories. My hypothesis is that the Ukrainian 
events that have led to the polarization and confrontation of previously co-existing discourses of (1) 
Russianness/Sovietness and (2) Germaneness. Following these events, new divisions inside the group 
might be constructed. 
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My second argument in favor of choosing the Ukrainian crisis as a background for the Russophones’ 
identity analysis relates to the specific situation in the sphere of mass communication provoked by 
those events. In 2014 General Phil Breedlove, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe described 
Russia as waging ‘the most amazing information warfare blitzkrieg we have ever seen in the history of 
information warfare’ (cit.ex.: McIntosh 2015 : 299-300). The narrative of information warfare from the 
side of the West can also be traced in Russian public sphere (Strategiya natsional'noy bezopasnosti 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii 2015). Whenever we accept the claims that an unprecedented threat does 
objectively exist from any side (which is not the case within the current research), it should be noted 
that the sides of the conflict give special attention to the potential of the mass media, including the new 
ones.  
(Expected) effects of the hegemonic intervention induced by the Ukrainian crisis can be described in a 
different manner. TIME's columnist Shuster (2014) argues that Russia is fighting for the allegiance of 
Russophones in order to create a 'fifth column' in the neighboring states, and the 2014 events are 
associated with an intensification of such activities. He emphasizes that Russophones in the Baltic 
states tend to read Russian mass-media – and this fact is skillfully used for the aims of propaganda. 
Shuster’s approach makes an accent on the role of media in constructing a difference between Russian-
speaking population and the native population of the Baltic states. According to his logic, this 
artificially exaggerated dissimilarity might help Moscow pursue an aggressive policy in the region, as 
it previously happened in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. However, there’s also a generally formulated 
‘big Other’ behind those small enemies. Thus, Shuster quotes Russian diplomat Konstantin Dolgov 
saying that Moscow regards itself an adversary of “the ghost of neo-Nazism” (ibidem : 48).  
Goble (2016) makes a different accent: he claims that Russia is actively constructing a community 
transcending the state borders on the basis of a positive (i.e. not based on explicit othering) similarity. 
This community – ‘Russian world’ – is defined in purely ethnic terms, that leads to general 
dissatisfaction of the non-Russian population of the country, and undermines the internal solidarity.  
Within the framework of the current research, I was both trying to find out the positivity and the 
negativity constructed by the discursive background the group lives against. Although relatively much 
attention is given to the individual representations of the Ukrainian conflict, I wasn’t following the task 
of either finding out its reasons, or labeling any representation as ‘corresponding to the facts’.  When 
referring to the concrete nominations applied by any side (e.g. separatists/opolchency1, Russia-
conflict/the state failure in Ukraine etc.), I didn’t set an aim of evaluating the corresponding actors and 
                                                          
1 From Russian: members of people's volunteer corps 
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events, but made an attempt to demonstrate how the identities are discursively constructed through the 
naming of individual social elements and their insertion into specific chains of equivalence (see more: 
Discourse analysis). 
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3. THEORETICAL & METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The current chapter outlines the poststructuralist approach as both a theory and method of research. It 
refers to the specific characteristics of this research platform and its place among approaches within 
the discipline of International Relations. The subchapter devoted to the concept of identity – one of the 
key concepts for the representatives of this research direction – embraces both a constructivist and a 
poststructuralist approaches thereto. The specific shift from 'self-other' relations to 'self-order' ones that 
can be traced within the poststructuralist approach, functions here as one of the main arguments in 
favor of choosing it for the current research. The third subchapter describes the backbone notions of 
this approach and defines the main concepts (nodal point, chain of equivalence, empty signifier etc.) 
that would be applied for the aims of empirical study. 
3.1 Poststructuralism in International Relations 
The discipline of International Relations (IR) is often mapped on the basis of the so called 'Great 
Debates', with the first of them being that between idealists and realists in the late 1930s and the early 
1940s and the second one – between behaviouralists and traditionalists in the 1960s. The substance of 
the third ‘Great Debate’, as well as the exact number thereof are disputable. For instance, Alexander 
Wendt argues that third ‘Debate’ deals with the role of 'individual and shared meanings that motivated 
actors to do what they did' (Wendt 2002 : 101-102). For Wendt, the Third debate is the one that 
transcends the discipline of IR and lies in the sphere of wider philosophical disputes. By contrast, 
Milja Kurki and Colin Wight distinguish between the neo-neo third debate and the fourth debate 
between positivism and post-positivism (Kurki & Wight 2013 : 20). At the same time, there are 
scholars who deny that the new approaches inspired by the post-positivist turn can be placed on the 
classical 'Great Debates' map (cf. Campbell 2013 : 225). 
Whenever a concrete scholar follows the tradition of ‘Great Debates’ mapping, most of them do share 
the idea of the second half of the 20th century being marked by an entrance of specific modes of 
thinking into the discipline of IR. Thus, Campbell writes that the changes were induced by the general 
dissatisfaction with the dominant realist perspectives that failed to embrace the global transformations 
and hear the voices of those excluded from the ‘normal’ political process. He argues that the 
introduction of new approaches into the IR was based on the linguistic and post-positivist turns in the 
Anglo-American philosophy. The result thereof is defined by Campbell as ‘poststructuralism’. (ibidem 
: 225-228). The peculiarity of this approach (and Campbell specifically mentions that poststructuralism 
is an approach, not a school) is interestingly explained by the author through the comparison with 
another product of the discipline environment – namely constructivism: 
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Even some constructivists maintain a strict sense of the material world external to language as a 
determinant of social and political truth. When faced with poststructural arguments, they will 
maintain that no discursive understanding can help you when faced with something as material 
as a bullet in the head. […] So how would a poststructuralist respond? First, they would say 
that the issue is not one of the materiality of the bullet or the reality of death for the individual 
when struck by the bullet in a particular way. […] Second, they would say that such a world – 
the body lying on the ground, the bullet in the head, and the shell casing lying not far away – 
tells us nothing itself about the meaning and significance of those elements. They would say 
that the constitution of the event and its elements is a product of its discursive condition of 
emergence, something that occurs via the contestation of competing narratives. Did the body 
and the bullet get to be as they are because of suicide, manslaughter, murder, ethnic cleansing, 
tribal war, genocide, a war of inter-state rivalry, or . . . ? (ibidem : 235-236) 
Hence, Campbell unites under the term of poststructuralism a plurality of approaches that study the 
way discourses constitute the social reality. Discourse, therefore, is understood not simply as an 
instrument that social agents use to describe certain objects, but as a way of constructing meanings that 
organizes and re-organizes both the objective sphere and actors' conceptions of themselves (cf. 
Cheskin 2010 : 134). The classical concept of discourse is rather broad; thus, Lessa generalizes the 
Foucauldian concept of discourse as “systems of thoughts composed of ideas, attitudes, courses of 
action, beliefs and practices that systematically construct the subjects and the worlds of which they 
speak” (Lessa 2006 : 285). In fact, it means that not only written and spoken texts can be interpreted as 
discourse, but also modes of behavior, norms, institutionalized practices etc. Nevertheless, for the aims 
of the current research I am going to concentrate on the texts in their ‘classical’ form, still keeping in 
mind that a broader analysis is possible and making some remarks on audial and visual characteristics 
of texts whenever it is feasible and necessary. 
The term poststructuralism itself indicates that the authors applying this approach refer to the heritage 
of structuralism. One of the central theses of structuralism, which also appears in poststructuralist 
texts, is the idea that every social element exists within a particularly structured system, and can only 
be understood in this context. Another structuralist thesis followed by poststructuralists, is a 
proposition that the production and circulation of signs constitute the social world. However, there is at 
least one key point where the scholars of the two directions disagree. Poststructuralists introduce the 
category of power as one of the key elements of their analysis (Merlingen 2013). Power is understood 
not just in repressive terms (i.e. as something that imposes limits), but in productive ones. Therefore, 
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the aim of the poststructuralist analysis is not to eliminate exclusions, but to highlight the forms of 
exclusions that constitute the social reality (Campbell 2013 : 233-234). 
Authors following the poststructuralist mode of thinking deal with different material within the 
discipline of IR. For instance, Campbell (1992) studied how the US foreign policy practices construct 
the US identity, while Edkins (1999) demonstrated how the dominant representations of famine and 
humanitarian crises construct specific understandings thereof. One of the most important advantages of 
this approach for me as a researcher consists in its giving attention to the context and issues normally 
excluded from the international relations analysis. So are the identities of ethnic/linguistic minorities: 
within the ‘traditional’ IR studies they are either prescribed a specific role (e.g. that of the ‘Fifth 
Column’ or a group infringed on its rights), or excluded as subjects of other disciplines. The 
poststructuralist approach to the IR broadens the sphere of the political and challenges an automatic 
understanding of group unities. At the same time, it brings in the idea of each identity’s being a 
product of concrete discourses, not transcendental belongings. Within the framework of the current 
research I am going to use the methodological set of instruments elaborated by Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe described in subsequent chapters.  
 
3.2 The Concept of identity in International Relations 
The nowadays generally accepted although disputable term «identity» originates from antiquity (from 
Latin identitas – “sameness”). Its variations are found in the classical German philosophy as well as 
Sigmund Freud's psychological theory. In the 1960s the term was introduced into social sciences, 
where its transformed definition resonated with the generational rebellions and the rise of the Black 
Power movement. The tide reached its peak in the 1980s with the development of race, class and 
gender criticism within academia. (Brubaker, Cooper 2000 : 2-3) 
As the term was becoming ubiquitous both in everyday discourses and academic research, several 
approaches to what identity is, were elaborated among scholars. Wodak, de Cilia, Reisigl and Liebhart 
(2009 : 11) distinguish between “static” and “dynamic” conceptualizations of identity. According to 
them, static concepts imply that people belong to a certain collective unit because of sharing some 
specific characteristics and, therefore, feel obliged to react as a group when this unit is threatened. The 
scholars characterize the static approach as being typical for early social theories of identity. By 
contrast, dynamic concepts try to embrace the complexity and inconstancy of identification processes.  
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Within the discipline of IR, the introduction of the term identity is associated with the so-called 
constructivist turn. Taking into consideration the specific nature of the IR traditional object of study 
(here one should remark that the first constructivist works were state-centric, too – but in a different 
way than realist ones), it is rather logical that the “dynamic” conceptualizations of identity have 
become dominating in the IR research. With some rare exceptions (e.g. Hungtington’s “Clash of 
Civilizations”) IR theorists concentrate on transformations rather than pre-defined actors’ identities. 
In “Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics” Alexander Wendt, 
one of the key figures of the constructivist IR research, defines identity in the following way:   
Actors acquire identities – relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about 
self – by participating in such collective meanings. Identities are inherently relational: "Identity, 
with its appropriate attachments of psychological reality, is always identity within a specific, 
socially constructed world," Peter Berger argues. Each person has many identities linked to 
institutional roles, such as brother, son, teacher, and citizen. Similarly, a state may have multiple 
identities as "sovereign," "leader of the free world," "imperial power," and so on. (Wendt 1992 : 
398) 
In his later work, “Social Theory of International Politics”, first published in 1999, Wendt further 
elaborates the constructivist idea of [state] identities and interests being constructed by shared  ideas, 
intersubjective understandings and expectations (Wendt : 2006).  
One of the recurrent topics within the academic discussions concerning the identity formation, which 
also appears by Alexander Wendt2, is connected with the conceptual pair of self/other. An exhaustive 
review of academic approaches to this dichotomy is made by Iver Neumann in “Uses of the Other: The 
East in European Identity Formation”. Neumann traces the concept's roots from Hegelian dialectics to 
postmodernist authors while including both philosophers, social anthropologists, historians, political 
scientists and IR theorists into a common map of the self/other research. 
Among others, Neumann cites Norwegian anthropologist Barth, who proposed to study the self/other 
nexus in terms of the boundary markers of identity (“diacritica”). Initially, Barth described the choice 
of diacritica (e.g. clothes, language or lifestyle) as a haphazard process, but has changed his mind in 
later works (Neumann 1999 : 4-5, 196). In Barth's “Ethnic Groups and Boundaries” one can follow the 
                                                          
2 Thus, in “Collective Identity Formation and the International State” Wendt writes: “Identification is a continuum from 
negative to positive-from conceiving the other as anathema to the self to conceiving it as an extension of the self. It also 
varies by issue and other: I may identify with the United States on military defense but with the planet on the environment. 
In any given situation, however, it is the nature of identification that determines how the boundaries of the self are drawn”. 
(Wendt 1994 : 386) 
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idea of political process being associated with political groups trying to influence the selection of 
certain signals. (Barth 1969 : 35) 
On the other side of his map of self/other studies Neumann makes a distinction between what he calls 
“the continental philosophical path” and “the Eastern excursion”. The former category is constructed 
in order to embrace the assimilatory practices in Western academia, while the latter includes such 
authors as Edward Said and goes back to the ideas of Russian philosopher Bakhtin (Neumann 1999 : 9-
20). Thus, Neumann quotes Bakhtin's criticism of “epistemological consciousness” that, according to 
the philosopher, pervaded all the nineteenth-century and twentieth-century philosophy: 
Epistemological consciousness, the consciousness of science, is a unitary and unique 
consciousness, or, to be exact – a single consciousness. […] Any unity is its own unity; it cannot 
admit next to itself any other unity that would be different from it and independent of it (the unity 
of nature, the unity of another consciousness), that is, any sovereign unity that would stand over 
against it with its own fate, one not determined by epistemological consciousness. (Neumann 1999 
: 13) 
Neumann himself expresses certain sympathy to the “Eastern excursion” path that follows the 
traditions of dialogical understanding of identity formation (as opposed to the dialectical interpretation 
associated with “the continental philosophical path”). Another academic dispute that Neumann 
discusses on the pages of “Uses of the Other…” is that between constructivists and poststructuralists. 
According to Neumann, poststructuralist scholarship faces several main limitations. He argues that the 
process of identification in poststructuralist studies is an affair “between a self and an order” instead of 
that “between a self and an other”, as it happens in constructivism (Neumann 1999 : 208-209). 
Furthermore, he presents a borderline between the scholarships as based on the issue of context-
traversing identities. Thus, poststructuralists claim that identities are “context-bound instantiations” 
that cannot be stable (Neumann 1999 : 212). Neumann himself endorses this argument as an 
ontological presupposition, but insists on introducing what he calls an “as if story” when it comes to 
political practice: 
Where practice is concerned, in order to be effective in the political field, one simply cannot put 
the self under erasure but must have what I will refer to as an "as if" story to tell about it. [...] 
Another, much more fatal example is the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the 1995. Once 
nationalist essentialist stories of self began to dominate, the only partially effective political 
counterstrategy was to be found in the representation of an alternative story of self that, being 
inevitably an "as if" story, stressed that different ethnic groups had "always" lived together 
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peacefully and that a splitting up of the community along ethnic lines would be a break with 
"tradition." […]Without an "as if" story to tell about the self of the human collective whose 
identity they wanted to represent, they were left politically inefficient (Neumann 1999 : 215) 
At the same time, he suggests following anthropologists and sociologists (namely Lemert and 
Gullestad) and distinguish between identities as such (context-bound identities) and selves (the term 
that is thought to embrace the ontologically impossible context-traversing identities): 
I would like to suggest that the making of selves is a narrative process of identification whereby a 
number of identities that have been negotiated in specific contexts are strung together into one 
overarching story. [...] it is a never-ending process, since there will always exist more identities 
than can easily be accommodated in a coherent story of self (Neumann 1999 : 218-219) 
Such an approach places Neumann closer to the constructivist side of his own map of academic 
research. As it was stated previously, constructivist understanding of the other's role is based on the 
idea of recognition. Thus, Alexander Wendt writes in “Social Theory of International Relations” that 
one of the outstanding contributions of the constructivist scholarship within the IR studies consists in 
emphasizing the role of mutual recognition of external sovereignty in mitigating the effects of 
international anarchy (2006 : 208). Neumann traces the same idea of recognition in Erik Ringmar's 
works and comes to the rather sympathetic conclusion that Ringmar has something that 
poststructuralists lack – “as if stories” of a state’s self. Within this theoretical construction a ‘self’ has 
three different options: to accept the stories being told of it by others, to abandon those stories that a 
not recognized in favor of others, or to insist on the original stories (Neumann 1999 : 223-224). 
What we see by poststructuralists, argues Neumann, is the disappearance of the ‘other’ as a subject 
(ibid : 222). Here I would better reformulate Neumann’s idea: what we see in poststructuralist 
scholarship is the transformation of ‘otherness’. Within the model described by constructivists, a ‘self’ 
and an ‘other’ carry on some kind of a dialogue based on Neumann’s “as if stories”, where each side 
makes respectful pauses to listen to the other one. As a result, an impression of (ontologically 
impossible) context-traversing identities is created. On the contrary, the poststructuralist ‘dialogue’ 
turns into a persistent exchange of information on the border of informational noise. Such a manner of 
contact erodes the borders between a ‘self’ and numerous ‘others’ and makes the one’s identities non-
fixable.3 
                                                          
3 Here one can remember Lacan's concept of a not "in-dividual" subject that describes an indefinable subject in permanent 
search of one's self (Il’in 2001) 
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In order to visualize the research potential that the poststructuralist perspective might afford within the 
current study, I turned to the works of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe working within the 
corresponding platform of political analysis. 
Although the authors avoid giving a direct definition to the term identity, several main ideas 
characterizing their approach can be formulated. (1) Identities (as well as meanings in general) are 
socially constructed on the basis of the ongoing language use i.e. discursive practices; (2) identities are 
flexible and never completely fixed; (3) there are no objective laws that divide society into particular 
groups; (4) collective identity follows generally the same principals as individual identity. 
(Jorgensen&Phillips 2002 : 25-44) 
In his work “On Populist Reason” first published in 2005, Ernesto Laclau elaborates the idea of a 
constructing role of the equivalence/difference dichotomy, as was previously done in “Hegemony and 
Socialist Strategy”. Laclau's social and political groups (for the purposes of his research the author 
concentrates on the group named "the people") are not based on pre-existing ‘real’ relations between 
social agents, but are constituted by discursive practices instead. Elements of the group are becoming 
the sources of multiple differently directed demands. When the political system fails to absorb those 
demands in a differential way (each in isolation from others), an equivalence relation is established 
between the unsatisfied demands. If the process successfully follows this track, we see how a vague 
feeling of solidarity transforms into a stable system of signification. The logic of equivalence leads to 
the consolidation of the unsatisfied group; its demands get condensed in the form of empty signifiers. 
Those signifiers reflect the plurality of individual demands and stay empty by their nature. At the same 
time, the logic of difference (as understood in Laclau’s “On Populist Reason”, see: Discourse 
Analysis) divides the society into two opposing camps: oligarchy/people; dominant groups/silent 
majority etc. (Laclau 2005 : 73-88) 
Following the same logic in “Hegemony and Socialist Strategy”, Laclau and Mouffe wrote: 
…a relation of equivalence absorbing all the positive determinations of the colonizer in opposition 
to the colonized, does not create a system of positive differential positions between the two, 
simply because it dissolves all positivity; the colonizer is discursively constructed as the anti-
colonized. [...] What we affirm is [...] that certain discursive forms, through equivalence, annul all 
positivity of the object and give a real existence to negativity as such. (2001 : 128-129). 
In her independently elaborated article “For a politics of nomadic identity” Chantal Mouffe continues 
her attack directed against the objectivism and essentialism that “dominate political analysis”. She 
argues: 
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[L]iberal thought employs logic of the social based on a conception of being as presence, and 
which conceives of objectivity as being inherent to things themselves. This is why it is impossible 
for liberal thought to recognize that there can only be an identity when it is constructed as a 
‘difference’, and that any social objectivity is constituted by the enactment of power. (Mouffe 
2005 : 103). 
Mouffe believes that there are no natural and original identities, as each identity is a result of multiple 
ceaseless interactions. At the same time, she adds an interesting remark to the analysis of collective 
identities. Thus, Mouffe argues that there always exists a possibility of antagonization within the pair 
of ‘us’ and ‘them’. She connects such an option with a situation when the ‘other’, who up until now 
has been considered as different, starts to be perceived as a threat to the group's existence. From that 
moment on, emphasizes Mouffe, the us/them relationship becomes political. (ibidem : 104-107) 
At this stage I would like to the make some remarks concerning the choice of theoretic basis within my 
study. Although my initial intention was to follow the constructivist track of research, it has soon 
become obvious for me that a poststructuralist perspective might be even more fruitful. First of all, my 
choice can explained by what Iver Neumann (1999 : 209).  calls the constructivists' unwillingness “to 
try to sling out of the political problematique surrounding sovereignty”. Indeed, most constructivist 
works devoted to the problems of identity concentrate on the national identity. As Adamson and 
Demetriou (2007 : 496-497) fairly note, non-national collective identities (such as diaspora ones) 
might be constructed in a way somehow similar to that of national identities, but they still differ from 
them in terms of their organizational structure and spatial logic. As the object of my research belongs 
to non-national collective identities, it seems reasonable to concentrate on a scholarship that works 
without strict connection with state borders.  
Furthermore, I find myself attracted by the transformation of the constructivist ‘self-other’ dichotomy 
into the ‘self-order’ one that developed within the poststructuralist mode of thinking. I believe that this 
shift lets us relatively privilege the ‘order side’. Inasmuch as the limited time resources prevent me 
from making a detailed analysis of the ‘self’ group, I concentrate on the order, i.e. on the general 
discursive background the group lives against. 
My final argument in favor of poststructuralist approach deals with its interestingly designed discourse 
analysis perspective elaborated by the corresponding scholars. Thus, this mode of research interlaces 
both theoretical and methodological guidelines, and leaves enough space for specific approaches of an 
individual researcher. The peculiarities of poststructuralist discourse analysis would be discussed later 
in “Discourse analysis”. 
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Summing up, the main theses concerning the concept of identity (and its practical application to the 
object of my research) can be formulated as follows: 
1. Collective identities, as well as individual ones are results of numerous and continuous social 
interactions. 
2. There are no ‘natural’, pre-existing relations between living-in-Germany Russophones. If any 
unity does exist among them, it is being discursively constructed. 
3. If a chain of equivalence is being constructed among the Russophones, this process develops 
simultaneously with the processes of differentiation. 
3.3 Discourse analysis 
When it comes to discourse, two different approaches to the term might be distinguished. As it was 
stated previously, a broad Foucauldian approach embraces the overall unity of social practices and 
institutions in a given a field, while a narrow one refers to textual claims that had to be analyzed in 
relation to non-discursive domains (Selby 2007 : 327). Within the current research, it seems reasonable 
to primarily concentrate on the textual understanding of discourse and fix several statements as a basis 
for our understanding: 1) every discourse is a product of concrete time and space, there are no 
universal or timeless discourses; 2) it is the ongoing language use that structures the social; 3) social 
meanings or divisions are never ultimate or fixed, but undergo a ceaseless process of discursive 
construction. 
Inasmuch as Laclau and Mouffe do not do much detailed discourse analysis of empirical material 
themselves and concentrate on theoretic constructions instead, I follow the track suggested by 
Jorgensen and Phillips (2002 : 49) and recapitulate the main concepts applied by the poststructuralist 
authors. Probably, the most fundamental mechanism mentioned in their work is a ‘nodal point’: 
“A nodal point is a privileged sign around which the other signs are ordered; the other signs 
acquire their meaning from their relationship to the nodal point”. (Jorgensen&Phillips : 26) 
When criticizing the classical concept of socialism in “Hegemony and Social Strategy”, Laclau and 
Mouffe pay special attention to such concepts as classism (i.e. the idea that the working class is an 
incarnation of social change regardless of the current climate in an individual sociopolitical formation) 
and revolution (understood as a foundational act that leads to a rational reorganization of society). The 
authors argue that in both cases we face some special kind of signifiers that can be called ‘nodal 
points’, or ‘master-signifiers’ (Laclau&Mouffe 2001 : 177). The characteristic feature of these 
signifiers is that being a particular element, they at some point become empty and assume a universal 
30 
 
structuring function within a discursive field (ibidem : xi). In the concrete case of classism and 
revolution it means that other signs are built into a concrete discursively constructed chain: 
In as much as Marxism claims to know the unavoidable course of history in its essential 
determinations, the understanding of an actual event can only mean to identify it as a moment in a 
temporal succession that is fixed a priori. Hence discussions such as: is the revolution of year x in 
country y the bourgeois-democratic revolution? Or, what forms should the transition to socialism 
assume in this or that country? (ibidem : 21) 
In “On Popuist Reason” Laclau comes up with a semantically close term ‘quilting point’. When 
explaining the term, Laclau turns to Žižek's example of Marlboro advertisement. Thus, Žižek shows 
how American identity is constructed through the recognition of the USA a Marlboro country. 
“Without Marlboro Americanness — in Žižek's example – would be a set of diffuse themes which 
would not be articulated into a meaningful totality”, writes Laclau. (2005 : 104-105) 
In Laclau's methodology, a nodal/quilting point becomes a key element of the collective identity 
formation. Laclau describes the entire process using the example of the Russian Empire at the 
beginning of the 20th century. The situation was characterized by extreme oppression, when workers 
started striking for higher wages, liberal politicians – struggling for liberal freedoms, students – 
supporting the relaxation of discipline in educational establishments etc. All these particular demands 
started to constitute an anti-system chain of equivalence. As a result, a need for a general equivalent, 
representing the chain as a whole, emerged. The body of one individual demand had to be emptied and 
assume a function of universal representation. At this moment it becomes a quilting point – as it 
happened with “bread, peace and land” in the example of the Russian revolution – and a new anti-
system identity might get crystalized around it (Laclau 2000 : 302-303; Laclau 2005 : 97).  
At this point I should dwell on the concept of empty signifiers often referred to by Laclau and Mouffe. 
Strictly speaking, Laclau defines an empty signifier as “a signifier without a signified” (2007 : 36). 
Laclau's argument consists in the following: when it comes to a specific quilting point, it is empty 
inasmuch as its function of representing the universality of an equivalence chain prevails over that of 
expressing a particular meaning. Moreover, some terms (e.g. justice, freedom, equality) normally 
function as empty signifiers, as their semantic role doesn't consist in expressing any positive content. 
What they do instead is incarnating an absent fullness; as Laclau fairly notes, in every social situation 
one can find some kind of injustice that gives sense to justice itself. (2005 : 96) Following this 
understanding, Laclau introduces the concept of floating signifiers to demonstrate how different 
discourses struggle to fix the meanings of some key elements: 
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Let us suppose a political discourse asserting that 'Labour is more capable than the Tory Party to 
ensure the unity of the British people'. [...] 'Unity' is a floating signifier because its signifieds are 
fixed only by the concrete contents provided by the antagonistic forces; but, at the same time, this 
floating is not a purely contingent and circumstantial one, because without it political argument 
would be impossible and political life would be a dialogue between the deaf. (2007 : 94-95) 
This quotation is significant inasmuch as it both shows how floating signifiers function within the 
political process, and brings us to the understanding of objectivity and related concepts. Jorgensen and 
Phillips (2002 : 36) note that Laclau's term objectivity refers to the discourses that are so firmly 
established that their non-natural character is forgotten. Interestingly, one can trace some parallel here 
with Žižek's concept of nomination: thus, he believes that “it must be part of the meaning of each name 
that it refers to a certain object because this is its name”. Žižek interprets this “dogmatic stupidity” as 
the dimension of the “big Other” (Neumann : 220).  The “big Other” is also visible in both above 
mentioned cases. With the term “unity” we see how certain borders of floating are being fixed4. With 
objectivity, we observe a similar process: borders of the normal, limits of the generally accepted are 
being constructed. 
Here I should note that in “Hegemony and Socialist Strategy” Laclau and Mouffe distance themselves 
from the classical Marxist understanding of hegemony associated with a fundamental class. What they 
suggest instead is a concept of hegemonic interventions exercised by whatever subject within the field 
of discursivity (2001 : 134-135). This term is applied to describe a “reservoir of meanings” that an 
individual element might have or used to have (Jorgensen&Phillips : 27). Any discourse, Laclau and 
Mouffe argue (ibid : 112), can be understood as an attempt to dominate the field of discursivity. With 
hegemonic interventions we observe the following scheme: 1) an antagonistic articulation comes from 
the field of discursivity and triggers the formation of a new equivalential chain and construction of 
new frontiers; 2) if the existing relational system finds itself in an organic crisis (i.e. there's a general 
weakening of the identity chains within the given sociopolical space), it becomes vulnerable to 
external hegemonic interventions; 3) if the hegemony is successful, a new structural system of 
identities is constructed. At this point the relations of hegemony transform into relations of power 
(idem : 134-138). 
Returning back to the mechanism of identity formation, I would like to once again emphasize that the 
logic of equivalence functions in parallel with the logic of difference. The latter leads to the 
particularization of equivalential chains and disperses a concrete ‘universal’ identity into a larger 
number of more specific ones (Laclau 2000 : 303). The introduction of this logic reflects one of the 
                                                          
4 According to Žižek, an inevitably impersonal form of such constructions indicates the dimension of the big Other  
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basic ideas of poststructuralist studies: neither meanings nor social divisions are fixed. The chains of 
equivalence are always interrupted by other hegemonic interventions that construct meanings and 
identities through different equivalential chains (ibid : 305).  
A hegemonic intervention is defined by Laclau as “an articulation that by means of force reconstitutes 
unambiguity”. (Jorgensen&Phillips 2002 : 48) In a more specific sense, a hegemonic intervention 
implies that one discourse is undermined by another one and a re-articulation of meanings and 
identities takes place. As an example thereof, Jorgensen and Phillips describe the situation of the First 
World War when an already established worker identity was suppressed through a hegemonic 
intervention in favor of national identities. (ibid) Within the framework of the current research the task 
of tracing the hegemonic interventions is fulfilled through introducing two types of national 
discourses, as well as outlining strong oppositional discourses within the national sociopolitical spaces. 
As it was stated previously (see: The Concept of Identity in International Relations), the concept of 
otherness doesn’t disappear from poststructuralist studies. Thus, in Laclau’s “On Populist Reason” one 
can see a slightly divergent idea of what the logic of difference is. When it comes to analyzing the 
differentiation process concerning a “universal” group of elements, he argues: 
[T]he only possibility of having a true outside would be that the outside is not simply one more, 
neutral element but an excluded one, something that the totality expels from itself in order to 
constitute itself (to give a political example: it is through the demonization of a section of the 
population that a society reaches a sense of its own cohesion). This, however, creates a new 
problem: vis-a-vis the excluded element, all other differences are equivalent to each other — 
equivalent in their common rejection of the excluded identity. (Laclau 2005 : 70) 
Therefore, Laclau argues that identities are formed through the interaction of equivalence and 
difference logics. As a result, what the author is trying to trace when deconstructing political texts is 
the way those logics function in every single case. Laclau himself gives few methodological 
instructions to follow; nevertheless, the general idea can be grasped. For example, Laclau recommends 
paying special attention to such a rhetoric instrument as synecdoche (simplistically explained by the 
author as “a part representing the whole”). From his point of view, a synecdoche incarnates a 
sociolinguistic process of an individual element becoming a quilting point, a master signifier that both 
constructs the chain of equivalence and represents it (idem : 72). 
Further instructions suitable for discourse analysis carried out in Laclaudian fashion, can be found in 
“The discursive construction of a national identity” by Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl and Liebhart. Thus, 
the scholars divide all the practices into several groups depending on whether they contribute to the 
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restoration, legitimation or relativisation of a social status quo and pay special attention to the 
establishment of power relations through the discursive acts (2009 : 8). When analyzing lexical units 
and syntactic devices that contribute to the construction of unity, sameness, difference, continuity or 
change, they recommend concentrating on such linguistic instruments, as metonymy, personification, 
the use of personal pronouns, temporal references and comparisons. The general tone, i.e. emotional 
background of the texts is to be taken into consideration, too (ibidem : 35-47). 
However, my first steps in empirical analysis have proved that consecutive tracing of all the lexical 
instruments might be challenging when large amounts of data are processed. Therefore, I formulated 
my task as finding out the patterns of discursive representations, i.e. emphasizing the most recurrently 
used linguistic devices belonging to the above-mentioned categories. Furthermore, special attention 
was given to the task of studying the ways how ‘we-ness’ and ‘otherness’ are formulated against the 
background of the Ukrainian crisis. To a certain extent, the indication of specific nodal points, as well 
as ‘we’ and ‘other’ groups is based on intuitive application of the theoretical framework, which makes 
the analysis vulnerable to criticism directed against its ‘subjectivity’. However, the chosen platform of 
research denies the possibility of ‘objectivity’ as such and emphasizes that the researcher always finds 
him- or herself within a specific discursive background that inevitably influences one’s perceptions. 
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4. METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION 
 
The following chapter is devoted to the interview as the major method of data collection applied for 
the current research. The first section traces the introduction of this method into social studies and 
emphasizes the main characteristics of poststructuralist research. Thus, the words of interviewees are 
not evaluated on the basis of ‘objective/biased’ dichotomy; what is brought into focus instead, are the 
group’s perceptions and what they tell an interviewer about this collective. The second subchapter is 
devoted to Skype interviewing as a specific method of synchronous interviewing that has both its 
advantages (e.g. spontaneity of responses, access to non-verbal cues) and drawbacks (dependence on 
good Internet connection, lack of interview 'intimacy' etc.). The third subchapter outlines the process 
of respondents’ recruitment and gives some general features of the online social spaces popular among 
the representatives of the group. A short return to the issue of interview distortion can be found in the 
fourth section, while the fifth one deals with another type of data relevant for the current research – 
namely, the mass communication materials belonging to one of the three main categories: German 
media, Russian media, Russophonic media published in Germany. 
4.1 Interview as a method of data collection 
Nowadays an interview can be described as one of the most ubiquitous methods of data collection 
within the social science; however, its inclusion into the researchers’ set of instruments was not a 
linear process. Platt (2011 : 33) distinguishes between an interview as a practice and as a 
methodological term. Whereas an interview as a practice can be traced already in the 17th century 
(although it wasn't characterized as such and separated from other modes of acquiring information), 
the first attempts to theorize on interviewing were made in the 20th century (Briggs 2011 : 911-912). 
In the 1920s and the 1930s an interviewee was regarded as a ‘gatekeeper’, i.e. a person who has a 
unique access to unknown information. Therefore, the researchers of that wave distinguished between 
respondents who can give objective information, and those who are biased – with a logical preference 
to the former. It was generally recommended to make no notes during an interview; in publications, the 
words of interviewees were given in a form of a summary. The same historical period witnessed the 
first steps being made in political polling and market research. This kind of activities stimulated the 
development of standardized structured interviews carried out by a group of interviewers instructed 
from a center. Such interviews followed an aim of accuracy, and were evaluated as successful if they 
had a great predicting potential. The standardized studies gave way to a concept of sampling – 
i.e. considering a respondent a member of a specific sample. (Platt 2011) 
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After the Second World War interviewing gains its full weight as a method of social research. 
However, in the late 1960s and 1970s traditional modes of interviewing found themselves under attack 
from a new generation of researchers. In their 1968 work on social research methodology Sjoberg & 
Nett criticized structured interviews for their orientation on testing an already existing hypothesis, 
instead of being “concerned with a discovery per se” (cit. ex.: ibidem : 41). In 1984 Taylor & Bogdan 
wrote on the importance of structuring an in-depth interview as a conversation of equals, where 
individual phrases can be misunderstood when taken out of context (ibidem : 42). 
Feminist research, as well as poststructuralist research in general, stimulated the academic interest to 
the question of how specific power relations are imposed into and reinforced through interviewing 
practices. Thus, feminist researchers addressed the question of women being spoken for in the very 
structure of the traditional interview. Therefore, they challenged the dominating presupposition that the 
relations of an interviewer and an interviewee are neutral, and the interview material can therefore be 
regarded as objective and independent (Fontana 2010 : 168-169). Similar thesis can be found in 
“Learning how to ask” written by poststructuralist scholar Briggs. He argues that the typical interview 
situations create power asymmetries between the sides, as an interviewer controls the context of 
interview by posing questions, regulating the length and scope of answers and later re-contextualizing 
the information in academic and media writings (Briggs 2011 : 910). 
Within the framework of the current research, the application of an interview as one of the methods of 
data collection partly follows the task of bringing the excluded voices in. Thus, the Russophones in 
Germany are recurrently spoken for against the background of some political events – and, at the same 
time, rarely given a chance to speak. However, gathering absent first-person stories was not the only 
aim. While working with the textuality of interviews, I tried to find out whether the dominating 
national discourses are (re)produced by the representatives of the group, and which layers of meaning 
are added by them. 
When conducting my interviews, I followed one of the main principles of poststructuralist 
interviewing that distinguishes it from the above-mentioned modes. Inasmuch as poststructuralist 
thinking erodes the border between ‘reality’ and its representations, an interview material is not 
evaluated through the lens of ‘objective-biased’. Therefore, when interviewing the respondents, I don’t 
follow an aim of finding out, what the mid-2010s Ukrainian conflict is ‘really’ about. My interest lies 
in the sphere of perceptions and the ways they are constructed. 
When referring to the poststructuralist trends in interviewing, Fontana (2010 : 166-167) distinguishes 
two main paths of asking questions. The first one is coded as ‘detached researcher’, and implies that an 
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interviewer is trying to deprivilege his or her agency. Although the concept of an interviewer’s 
invisibility comes from quantitative research, this type of interview has a qualitative orientation. A 
researcher minimizes his or her privileges (e.g. by making an interview less structured) – and the focus 
is moved to what an interviewee is willing to say. The second path, described by Fontana, increases the 
comparative weight of an interviewee. Some scholars (e.g. Seidman 1991) develop this approach to the 
stage of ‘we’-relations constructed between an interviewer and interviewee. The power of an 
interviewer is, thus, not put outside the brackets, and an interview is analyzed as any other social 
encounter. 
Following the aims set in the framework of the current research, I found it reasonable to choose the 
first track. Although I fully realize that an interview would inevitably lead to power disparities, I 
would like to leave those issues for further analysis. In this research, I was interested in the ways 
identities of respondents are constructed through their discursive acts. In order to deprivilege my 
stance, I avoided strictly structured question; although I had a quite detailed plan of questions I would 
like to ask (see: Appendix 1), I only followed the general directions of questions with collaborative 
respondents. Thus, there were 5 categories of questions in the questionnaire: (1) finding out whether a 
respondent is familiar with the Ukrainian events; (2) determining the main sources of information on 
the Ukrainian crisis used by the respondent; (3) characterizing one’s personal perception of the 
Ukrainian crisis; (4) characterizing the respondent’s identity; (5) sociodemographic information. 
Whereas categories (1), (2) and (5) left less space for improvisation, categories (3) and (4) were 
normally structured in a more flexible form.  
4.2 Skype interviewing as a specific method 
Inasmuch as logistic constraints make a set of face-to-face interviews impossible in the framework of 
this research, I had to choose one of the methods associated with modern communication technologies. 
When making a further choice between synchronous (e.g. telephone interviews, video-calls, chats) and 
asynchronous instruments (e.g. e-mail interviews), I preferred the former. Thus, asynchronous 
interviewing leaves more space for an interviewee to drop out of the process and stop responding to 
later questions (see: O'Connor et.al. 2011 : 272), which creates potential problems for me as an 
interviewer. Although providing a respondent with additional time to answer the questions and edit his 
or her answers, an asynchronous interview destroys the spontaneity of responses and, according to 
O'Connor et. al. (ibidem: 275), encourages the participant to produce 'socially desirable' reactions, 
which are less applicable for identity analysis. Furthermore, this mode of interviewing is not designed 
for semi-structured interviews, and implies that additional e-mails should be sent to clarify unclear 
points. 
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Among the synchronous interviewing methods, Skype interviewing seems to be the most suitable one. 
Being an online instrument, this method embraces several meaningful features of a traditional face-to-
face interview. Thus, it provides an interviewer with an opportunity to establish a positive ambience 
needed to deprivilege his or position (or, vice versa, to privilege the position of the respondent). 
Another characteristic that makes Skype interviewing especially suitable for poststructuralist research, 
consists in its proving the researcher with non-verbal cues that might help to contextualize the 
interview (Deakin, Wakefield 2014 : 605-606). 
Skype is a software that can be downloaded for free; it enables interviewers to connect with otherwise 
inaccessible respondents all over the world. However, this mode of interviewing is also associated with 
specific difficulties. The most obvious problem discussed by Seitz (2016 : 230-231) relates to technical 
issues. Successful interviewing critically depends on the sides' access to the high-speed Internet, and 
even in those cases calls might unexpectedly disconnect. Further difficulties emerge when the 
‘intimacy’ of interviews in taken into consideration. Warren (2011 : 93-94) and Seitz (2016 : 232) both 
come to the conclusion that a fear of being audio- and videotaped influences the potential respondents, 
especially in those cases when issues that might be personally damaging, are discussed. However, 
scholars make different accents when addressing this problem. Whereas Seitz concentrates on an 
interviewer's inability to establish a personal connection online, Warren emphasizes how different the 
‘on and off the record’ behavior of a respondent might be due to his or her own perception of audio- 
and videotaping, influenced by social class, age, context and previous experiences. 
4.3 Recruiting respondents 
The logic of survey research implies that a ‘sample’ group of people representing larger population is 
interviewed so that the conclusions true for a smaller group would be generalizable for the concrete 
population (Warren 2011 : 87). However, ‘sampling’ research is quite difficult to be conducted. If the 
generalizations are to be made on large populations, a relatively large ‘sample’ group of respondents 
should be interviewed too, which makes it almost impossible for a single researcher to make a 
representative sample survey within a limited period. In each single case a researcher is expected to 
define key characteristics (e.g. age, gender, ethnic background, education level etc.) and put others 
outside the research framework. Furthermore, specific quotas are to be observed when recruiting 
respondents (Elias & Lemish 2011 : 1252). 
Briggs (2011 : 918) criticizes the logic of sampling; he writes that classifying interviewees as members 
of a specific group, a researcher follows a presupposition that a respondent is speaking for this group – 
thereby representing him or her as a one-sided subject. Taking this thesis into consideration, I try to be 
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quite cautious with generalizations based on my interviews, and continuosly re-contextualize them 
through the use of larger segments of data (e.g. the material of mass communication). Nevertheless, 
when recruiting respondents, I tried to maximize the number of represented subgroups. Thus, I took 
into consideration the formal belonging to one of the above-mentioned categories (Spätaussiedler, 
Russian-speaking Jews, other Russophones), gender, age and country of origin (Russia and Ukraine). 
Such a decision was based on my hypothesis that certain subgroups are exposed to specific hegemonic 
interventions (e.g. the narrative of Germaneness was expected to be directed at the Russian-speaking 
repatriates).  
The process of recruiting the respondents turned out to be one of the most challenging stages of 
research. Taking into consideration the aim of maximizing the representativeness, I applied two 
strategies of recruitment. The first group of interviewees embraces those whom I previously had 
contact with, their relatives and acquaintances. Following the track described by Richardson (cit. ex. 
Warren 2011 : 89), I announced my research interest to most people I met with the hope that they 
would either volunteer themselves (if they meet the requirements of living in Germany for at least 3 
years and speaking Russian as a mother tongue), or put me in contact with those who might be willing 
to participate. After finding a respondent, I made an attempt to practice ‘snowballing’ method (ibidem 
: 90), i.e. asked him or her to draw in further interviewees through his or her social networks. 
The second group of respondents includes those found via social networks (facebook.com, vk.com, 
ok.ru). The 2016 Rusmedia report mentions websites Odnoklassniki (ok.ru) and Vkontakte (vk.com) 
among the most popular social networks used by Russophones in Germany. The weekly number of 
users coming from Germany is evaluated at the level of 1.348.617 for Odnoklassniki and 550.710 for 
Vkontakte (Rusmedia 2016 : 49-51). Almost no information on typical characteristics of users from 
Germany can be found in open sources; most user portraits are outlined on the basis of Russian 
material. Thus, the report of Brand Analytics (2016 : 6-9) claims that almost an equal number of 
Vkontakte users belong to 18-24 years and 25-34 years age categories (32,3% and 32,1% respectively), 
while the audience of Odnoklassniki is primarily divided between three leading categories: 25-34 years 
(26,6%), >55 years (20,9%) and 35-44 years (20,7%). However, the absence of age data in a relatively 
large portion of cases (more than 60% accounts in Vkontakte) makes the statistic unreliable. 
Facebook, the world’s largest social network (Statista 2017), is only casually mentioned in the 
Rusmedia report, which might be explained by the purposes of the paper. Thus, it is prepared by a 
transmitting company working exclusively with Russophonic media in order to give guidance on how 
advertisement can be distributed. Furthermore, it doesn’t mention such popular Germany-based 
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networks, as VZ-networks (www.meinvz.net, www.studivz.net) or Wer-kennt-wen (www.wer-kennt-
wen.net). 
Although my observations on the Russophones’ online activities cannot be called generalizable due to 
the absence of statistical instrumentation, I would suppose the following behavior pattern to be typical 
of different audiences:  
 younger Russian-speaking users from Germany tend to use Facebook; 
 in both Facebook and above-mentioned Germany-based networks communities that must 
embrace Russophones usually use German as a language of communication;  
 Vkontakte is more popular among up-to-35-year-old Russophones living in Germany, whereas 
older users prefer Odnoklassniki and Mail.ru; 
 the most active public communities of Russophones in Germany are located on Vkontakte 
platform with the users representing the third analytical subgroup (other Russophones) being 
the most active participants thereof. 
After investigating the online communities on platforms chosen as the key sources (facebook.com, 
vk.com, ok.ru), I decided to concentrate on the following types of public pages: (1) groups of 
compatriots in Germany in general, or individual cities in particular; (2) ‘Podslushano’ (from Russian 
– ‘overheard’) in Germany, or in a particular city; (3) communities where political topics are 
discussed. The first category has proved to be rather ineffective for massive recruitment, inasmuch as 
the communities of this type are in most cases left by their moderators, and, hence, full of repeated 
advertisements. However, the vast lists of communities’ participants still gave me as a researcher a 
chance to recruit respondent through the mechanism of personal messages. On the contrary, 
‘Podslushano’ groups represent the currently popular type of communities, where the content is 
actively co-produced by the participants and published anonymously. Such a mechanism let me 
announce the respondents’ recruitment to a relatively large public. In some individual cases I faced the 
problem of moderator’s unwillingness to publish a post that mentions Ukraine, as the latter might 
provoke disputes among the participants. The third category of communities, i.e. the political ones, 
were processed in the manner close to the groups of compatriots. In order to recruit potential 
interviewees, I analyzed the lists of community participants, writing out those coming from Germany. 
After taking a fluent view of their personal pages, I chose active users to write a personal message to. 
My typical recruitment announcement published in online communities was formulated as follows:  
Dear participants of the community, 
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My name is Anastasia Strakevich and I am currently working on a master thesis for Saint-
Petersburg State University and the University of Tampere (Finland) devoted to the perceptions 
of the Ukrainian conflict by the Russophones living in Germany. For my research, I conduct a 
series of interviews with the representatives of the group. 
If you (1) speak Russian as your mother tongue; (2) live in Germany for more than 3 years; (3) 
would like to participate in the research, please, write me a personal message or leave a 
comment under this post. 
The interviews are conducted via Skype. The questions are connected with: 
1) the mass media that you use to get information on the Ukrainian events; 
2) your personal perception of the Ukrainian conflict (you will be expected to give detailed 
answers); 
3) your personal perception of the Russophonic community in Germany and its relations with 
the receiving society. 
The interviews will be audiotaped. The materials will only be used for research purposes. The 
interviews are anonymous, and all the quotations will be given under pseudonyms. 
One of unexpected problems that arose during the respondents’ recruitment was connected with the 
use of a specific preposition in the Russian version of the phrase ‘in Ukraine’. Thus, the Russian 
linguistic norm permits both options 'na Ukraine' and 'v Ukraine' (Gramota.ru 2017), while Kiew 
insists on the application of 'v' preposition, explaining it through the similar phonation of 'na Ukraine' 
(in Ukraine) and 'na okraine' (on the periphery) that is claimed to prescribe the state with a minor role 
compared with Russia. In one of the cases my automatic use of 'na' preposition provoked intensive 
debates among the participants of a Russophonic online community. 
All in all, I managed to recruit 15 respondents with different backgrounds. The proportion between the 
representatives of the three Russophonic subgroups in Germany (Russlanddeutsche, Russophonic Jews 
and other Russophones) turned out to be different from that among the Russophonic population in 
general - thus, most interview requests sent to Spätaussiedler were declined, while Russophonic Jews 
and other Russophones (Russophonic students and specialists working in Germany) were, as a rule, 
more eager to participate. A list of respondents’ pseudonyms with the respective sociodemographic 
data can be found in Appendix 2. 
4.4 Interview distortion & Research ethics 
The Ukrainian topic has a reputation of being a dangerous one. Multiple narratives circulating in 
Russian sociopolitical space got organized by the Ukrainian crisis into the common discourse of 
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‘othering’ the West. As a result, the West has become the key Other, whose shadow is recurrently 
traced in the spheres having no direct connection with the foreign politics. At the same time, the 
Western media portray today's Russia as threat similar to that that existed during the Cold War (see: 
German media & the Ukrainian conflict, Russian media & the Ukrainian conflict).  
Such an atmosphere seems to have created a situation, when the Russophones feel the pressure of 
choosing between ‘us’ and ‘them’. From this angle, an interview with a Russian researcher represents 
a case of exaggerated choice. Although no obvious threat does exist for those living in Germany, the 
media background of being represented as “Kremlin’s agents” still might influence those supporting 
pro-Russian perceptions of the Ukrainian crisis. The proponents of the pro-Ukrainian point of view 
might expect a Russian interviewee to distort their opinions in a damaging way. As a result, the share 
of neutral statements was expected to be high, while many interview requests sent to politically radical 
citizens were expected to come without answer. 
The expectations have proved to be true; however, this was not the only type of distortion possible in 
the concrete interview situation. Some nuances might have arisen while interviewee ‘neutral’ 
respondents, too. In order to avoid being ‘othered’ by an interviewee and, therefore, being included 
into the process of one’s identity formation to the extent that won’t let avoid following Fontana’s 
second track (see: Interview as a method of data collection), I took the stance of a sympathetic 
interviewer. Additional questions were asked when a participant was telling his or her personal stories 
and attitudes; multiple non-verbal signs from the side of an interviewer (nodding, smiles etc.) were 
given to make the respondent feel comfortable with the situation.  
Special attention was given to the issue of personal data safety. Interviewees were suggested to use 
pseudonyms to protect their personal information. Furthermore, when questions concerning 
sociodemographic data were asked, the respondent were allowed to give indistinct answers (e.g. to 
describe their occupation in general phrases, or mention the Bundesland they live in instead of naming 
a concrete city or town – which was especially actual for the interviewees living in small 
communities).  
The context of an online interview itself had a dual influence on the level of personal safety. On the 
one hand, some of the respondents whom I contacted with, were using fake accounts in social media, 
which made it difficult for a non-specialist to reveal their identities. On the other hand, the 
delusiveness of online anonymity has become widely discussed topic in today’s mass media – as a 
result, more people get concerned with the protection of personal data. Users realize that their location 
might be traced, and the words they say on the record might be published or intercepted by an 
42 
 
unknown third side. When conducting the interviews, I tried to make it clear that the respondents’ 
identities are protected. All the collected information is stored on an encrypted USB flash drive; no 
real names are mentioned in the verbatim report. 
4.5 Mass communication analysis 
Poststructuralist thinking makes an accent on the fact that the narratives (re)produced by social actors 
are limited by the existing discursive background. Consequently, a scholar who tries to trace those 
narratives should first analyze the discourses dominating within the concrete social formation, and 
delineate the potential hegemonic interventions (i.e. strong oppositional discourses). In order to reach 
this aim, I carried out an analysis of the key mass media belonging to three main categories: (1) 
German media; (2) Russian media; (3) Russophonic media published in Germany. One of the media – 
RT (Russia Today) channel – is placed in the group of the Russian sources with certain reservations. 
Thus, the channel embraces several news networks broadcasting in different languages from Moscow, 
London and Washington (RT 2017). Within the framework of the current research, I concentrate on 
the Russian version of the channel – although I realize that there are Russophones who prefer watching 
a non-Russian version thereof. Furthermore, the limited character of the time resources made me 
decline an intention to analyze non-Russian media issued at the post-Soviet space (above all, the 
Ukrainian ones), as well as Western media that have global audiences. 
My choice of individual mass media was primarily based on quantitative indices. Thus, the German 
media were selected on the basis of the 2015 report prepared by the Union of Private Radio- and TV-
media (Verband Privater Rundfunk und Telemedien e.V.). For instance, FOCUS online takes the first 
place among the most popular online periodicals in Germany with 19,45 Mio unique users pro month 
(VPRT-Mediennutzungsanalyse 2015 : 53), while Bild holds the second place in the same rating, and 
the sixth one when websites with dominating user-generated content are included (ibidem). Spiegel, 
having the third place, was chosen as a key leftist paper that challenges the conservative 
understandings (Ahler 2016 : 132). ZDF, the channel with the second largest audience in Germany, 
was selected to give an example of discourse analysis that doesn’t confine itself with ‘classic’ 
textuality, but includes other visual and audial instruments in addition. Finally, far less popular Junge 
Freiheit was chosen for its strong right orientation and association with the far right party Alternative 
für Deutschland (AfD). Here I should note that there is at least one more paper that was previously 
often referred to as ‘AfD’s mouthpiece’ – Compact Magazin. Nowadays it finds itself in conflict with 
the party’s leadership (Elsässer 2017). Due to the general similarity of the views expressed by two 
editions, Compact Magazin is not included into the analysis. However, one outstanding characteristic 
thereof should be mentioned: the paper has a Russian version (Compact Online 2017). 
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The choice of Russophonic mass-media turned out to be rather complicated. There’s almost no 
research on Russian media preferred by Germany-based Russophonic communities. The Rusmedia 
report (2016 : 34) only mentions Channel 1 as one of the key Russophonic TV channels available in 
Germany. With 250 million viewers in 190 countries, Channel 1 positions itself as most popular 
Russophonic channel in the world (Pervyi kanal 2017). An analysis of the local providers’ supply 
demonstrated that most companies offering Russophonic TV packages also include RTR5 channels 
therein. Two of them – Rossiya 1, the second largest TV channel in Russia, and Rossiya 24, an 
influential news channel – were also selected for the current research. Ekho Moskvy, an oppositional 
radio station, was picked out to demonstrate an example of challenging discourses. The specific choice 
of this mass medium was based on Liveinternet statistics that indicate a relatively high interest of 
German audiences to the station’s website (Liveinternet 2017). 
The third category of mass communication, i.e. Russophonic media published in Germany, embraced 
both 'classic' printed editions and new media with user-generated contents. The selection of printed 
editions was primarily based on their contents, as most of the Russophonic media published in 
Germany confine themselves with advertisement, legal advice and entertainment sectors. Those 
referring to political topics (Russkaya Germaniya, Berlinskii Telegraf, Neue Zeiten) were picked out 
for the current research. More attention was given to new media: most of the online communities that 
(1) were active throughout the researched period and (2) deal with political topics, were found at either 
Vkontakte, or Odnoklassniki platform. The pages I concentrated on, included local and nation-wide 
communities of Russophones (e.g. Podslushano Germaniya, Zhivjom v Germanii: Novosti i Politika, 
Nasha Germaniya, Russlanddeutsche für Deutschland) and political communities with Russophonic 
background (e.g. Russlanddeutsche für AfD, Die Einheit). 
  
                                                          
5 RTR (Federal State Unitary Enterprise "The Russian Television and Radio Broadcasting Company"), the largest media 
corporation in Russia 
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5. RUSSOPHONES IN GERMANY: TENDENCIES OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION 
 
The following chapter is devoted to the analysis of empirical data. The first section describes the 
general social background faced by the Russophonic community between the early 1990s (the first 
post-bipolar wave of migration) and 2014. It elaborates the notion of Russophones in Germany being 
initially ‘othered’ by the German society. The premises for two main tendencies in collective 
identification are traced: (1) the tendency of disintegration based on formal criteria of ethnic 
belonging; (2) the tendency of ‘negative’ unification pre-defined by common problems faced by 
different subgroups. The second section is structured in a way that distinguishes between the 
discourses dominating in Russian and German sociopolitical spaces. Strong oppositional discourses are 
traced, too. The third subchapter brings together the findings of research. It outlines the ways the 
dominant/oppositional discourses are reproduced in immigrants’ social spaces and makes several 
assumptions on the tendencies of Russophones’ identification. However, it should be noted that the 
‘order’ faced by the Russophonic ‘self’ is multidimensional, which makes the causal effects of the 
Ukrainian events quite limited. Inasmuch as the concrete limits of the causation are questionable, I 
concentrate on the ‘tendencies of identification during the Ukrainian crisis’, not ‘caused by the crisis’. 
Finally, the ‘Discussion’ subsection specifies the contribution of my conclusions to the general 
discussion on the topic. For instance, I claim that my findings implicitly support the arguments of 
Georg Elwert who emphasized the positive influence of migrants' own organizations on their adaption 
in the receiving society. 
5.1 Russophones in Germany: between 1990s and 2014 
From the identification point of view, the situation the Spätaussiedler found themselves in, was rather 
difficult. The dismantling of the communist regime led to the revaluation of personal identities all over 
the ex-Soviet space. The collapse of the Soviet Union turned out to be a pure identification crisis, 
when the existing quilting points that condensed around the communist ideology lost their meanings. 
The ‘Soviet people’ was disintegrating together with the Soviet state with multiple individual identities 
(ethnic, religious, territorial etc.) being established. A striking example of the influence exerted by 
these events can be found in the interview of a Russlanddeutsche Eugen Litwinow. 
As we were living in Kazakhstan, I never realized that my mother is German by birth. After the 
collapse of the Soviet Union the Kazakh language became the state one, and my parents said: 
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we won't stay here anymore. There was a choice of either to follow my father's descent and go 
to Russia, or to resettle to Germany.6 (Mediendienst Integration 2014) 
The case of Eugen Litwinow demonstrates how an identity might be constructed on the basis of ethnic 
origin being given a special meaning against the background of an identity crisis. The situation was 
quite different for those who were already aware of being Russlanddeutsche when the iron curtain fell 
down. Such an example can be found in an interview of Georg Schmalz, an active member of the 
Russophonic community: 
My ancestors were from Wiesenburg (now located in France) and came to the Ukrainian village 
Landau around 1840 – and lived there till the communists came to power. After some of my 
ancestors were accused of being kulaks, dispossessed and executed, the family was dispersed 
all over the Soviet state [...]. My grandmother taught me German, and I'd been speaking 
German till I went to school. When I later came to Germany, I realized that my grandmother's 
language was a 19th century one [...]. I believe, I am German, although we are called 
Russlanddeutsche in Germany. (Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei 2008) 
Thus, he acknowledges that being German was something that he realized when living in the Soviet 
Union – however, this was a specific, 19th-century ‘Germanness’. Similar experience of being alien 
both in the (ex-)Soviet Union and Germany can be found in another interview given by 
Russlanddeutsche Tamara Barabasch: 
People hear my name and my accent and say: oh, you are Russian! [...] We thought we were 
returning to our homeland, but we stay strangers. (Thüringer Allgemeine 2016) 
Thus, the representatives of the group were living inside an ethnically alien social space. Some of them 
were deeply incorporated into the existing social ties within this space (for instance, a 16-year-old girl 
Elena writes: “Here [in Germany] I am German, there [in Russia] I am Russian” (Merkul'ewa 2013: 
30), while other groups practiced some kind of ‘othering’ vis-à-vis Russians to keep their own 
identity.7 There existed a shared mythologized belief that the group of the Russlanddeutsche was 
belonging to a larger group of the German Volk. On the other side of the border a myth of a German 
Volk transcending the formal state territory was also established – not without reason was the German 
legislature formulated in a fashion that both provided for the re-unification of the state and the 
repatriation of the «expellees». However, what is more important is that these were two separated 
                                                          
6 Hereinafter the translations from German and Russian are mine. The original quotations can be found in Appendix 3 
7 An interesting example thereof is a story of a 59-year-old woman whose grandmother often told her, as she was a child, to 
keep her feet clean in order to be different from «Russian girls» (Savoskul 2006). 
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myths and two different identities – that can be proved by the experiences of such people as Tamara 
Barabasch or Georg Schmalz who claim to be repeatedly treated as Russians. 
The German state has made an enormous effort to break the social boundaries between the «normal» 
Germans and the resettlers – as well as between the Western and the Eastern parts of the united 
country. However, the discursive construction of commonness was developing in parallel with other 
types of discourses. The most graphic reflection of the debates can be found in the above-mentioned 
transformation of the German legislature – the Spätaussiedler who were first perceived as a special 
group of Germans gradually became a group of foreigners (cf. Takle 2011). «The door is kept open. 
We are on the side of those people who belong to us», claimed Federal Representative for Foreigners 
Horst Waffenschmidt in 1996 (Spiegel 1996b). The same year a rather populist SPD-politician Oskar 
Lafontaine put the Spätaussiedler in a row with all other foreigners and accused them of burdening the 
German social system and living off pensions and welfare benefits (Spiegel 1996a). Several surveys 
conducted in 1996 showed that more than 60% of Germans agreed with Lafontaine's idea of restricting 
the number of newcomers (Münz & Ohliger 2004 : 290). 
The common feature of the 1990s and the first years of 2000s was a de-facto absence of the resettlers 
in the German sociopolitical space. Thus, Münz and Ohliger wrote that by 1998 only about 10 
Aussiedler had got seats in town council in the areas where they constituted approximately 20% of the 
population. Even those representatives of the community claimed to be ignored by others as 
incompetent. A special attention should be given to the case of Heimat – an organization established in 
1998 to represent the Russian-speaking community in Germany. Münz and Ohliger argue that the 
relative unpopularity of the Heimat was based on its self-identification as a group for Russian 
Germans, while a plurality of Aussiedler wanted to be treated simply as Germans. (ibidem). 
This statement functions as a good indicator of the processes in the environment the group found itself 
in. In fact, the Spätaussiedler were reproducing the discourses of the receiving society that stigmatized 
Russianness as anti-social behavior. German mass-media recurrently mentioned Russlanddeutsche in 
the context of discussing crime; resettlers described in articles gamble, abuse drugs, find themselves in 
prison (cf. Zeit online 2000, Deutsche Welle 2002, Spiegel 2004). The districts they lived in were 
characterized as unsafe and criminalized (Frankfurter Allgemeine Rhein-Main 2004). Furthermore, the 
representatives of the group were portrayed as state dependents (Spiegel TV 1996). Positive images of 
the Russlanddeutsche simply disappeared: being good therefore could be interpreted as being German 
and get rid of all the Russianness in one’s identity. 
Such a conclusion brings us to a broader question: was the reception of the Spätaussiedler an 
integrationist or an assimilationist practice?  The German state itself apparently prefers the term 
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«integration». The introduction of this concept into the political lexicon was a hard step: till the late 
1990s the German political elites had resisted recognizing the FRG a country of immigration (Weber 
2011 : 5). Between 2000 and 2005 a new rhetoric of multiculturalism was formulated with the term 
«multiculturalism» functioning as a typical empty signifier. The meanings attached to the term 
reflected the current relations of power between the competing discourses. Thus, while the CDU/CSU 
promoted the inclusion of migrants on the basis of the dominating culture (Leitkultur), the Red-Green 
coalition promoted a more civic approach that allowed immigrants to keep their cultural characteristics 
(Volkery 2004). Anyway, the focus of the discussion changed: while in the 1990s the Spätaussiedler 
issues were considered to be the main problem, the 2000s saw a securitization of Muslim immigrants. 
Prominent migration researchers Castles and Miller distinguish between three strategies a government 
might apply to deal with multi-ethnic population: differential exclusion, assimilation and 
multiculturalism. For the aims of the current research I suggest concentrating on the latter two 
concepts. 
Assimilation may be defined as the policy of incorporating migrants into society through a one-
sided process of adaptation: immigrants are expected to give up their linguistic, cultural or 
social characteristics and become indistinguishable from the majority population. 
Multiculturalism [...] implies that immigrants should be granted equal rights in all spheres of 
society, without being expected to give up their diversity. (Castles & Miller 2003 : 250-251) 
Bringing these concepts of assimilation and multiculturalism into the identity sphere and taking into 
consideration the fact that the referent group consists of repatriates, I can reformulate it as follows. 
Assimilationist practices suggest the establishment of ethnic identification chains as an ideal goal, 
while integrationist practices (i.e. multiculturalism) set an aim of civic identification. Whereas a ‘good 
Turk’ was expected to follow his or her cultural traditions in a way compatible with the German 
legislature and public interests (in this case an idea of organizing Islamic religious education on the 
German soil is worth being mentioned), «a good Russlanddeutsche» was expected to become German. 
Not without reason are the Spätaussiedler characterized as Germans in the official statistics – although 
this might even prevent the authorities from estimating the number of the group representatives 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Rhein-Main 2004). The German state applied a purely assimilationist practice 
towards the group, and the social structures got involved into this hegemonic intervention. 
Although the legal status of the so-called Kontingentflüchtlinge (i.e. those whose entry into the FRG 
was based on Jewish descent) was different from that of repatriates, the problems that they faced 
turned out to be quite similar. Thus, Judith Kessler adduces statistics indicating that 75% of the 
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Russophonic Jews in Berlin didn't have a chance to work within their speciality, and their linguistic 
competences were limited and degraded because of dominant intra-group contacts (Kessler 2003). As 
it was stated previously, the invitation of Russophonic Jews was aimed at re-establishing the Judentum 
in Germany. They were expected to practice the specific forms of Jewish life so that the social 
landscape could be enriched by their culture. Therefore, the government promoted the development of 
Jewish communities; using the term of German sociologist Elwert (1982), one can say that the 
Binnenintegration8 was active among the community members. Thus, the community formed its own 
religious and cultural organizations, support groups, educational and sports unions (Ben-Rafael et al. 
2010 : 36). 
However, a large part of the group was soon accused of being 'non-Jewish' and 'othered' by both the 
Jewish minority and the German society in general. When referring to this issue, Körber (2005 : 22-23) 
cites her interview with the President of a Jewish community: 
I ask people: do you know why you came to Germany? They answer: yes, because the life 
became bad in Russia. I tell them: [the government wants you to] restore the Jewish 
communities. It means that you should join the community, and the community is not a cultural 
organization, but a religious institution 
The campaign against ‘fake Jewishness’ among the Russophones was developed by mass media, too. 
Whereas during the first years of immigration Russophonic Jews were generally recognized to be a 
well-educated group that should be represented positively (Körber 2005 : 65), the mid-1990s saw a 
dramatic turn in media discourses. In August 1995 Spiegel published an article that claimed: "most 
[Russophonic] Jews only get acquainted with Jewishness after arriving to Germany" (Spiegel 1995a). 
The same article makes an attempt to celebrate the contribution of the Russophones to the 
development of the German culture; however, several months later the tone of the paper changed. 
Thus, a December 1995 article accuses Russophonic Jews of being connected with Russian mafia and 
forging documents that affirm their Jewish descent (Spiegel 1995b).  
The situation was further poisoned by cases that were interpreted as direct anti-Semitism. Thus, the 
representatives of the group tell stories of being denied a job or insulted by individual Germans 
because of their Jewish descent (cf. Kessler 2003, Frankfurter Allgemeine 2005). However, it must be 
the fear to sound anti-Semitic that deterred German media discourses. Whereas the direction of 
discourses on Russlanddeutsche was almost stable, the discussion on Russophonic Jews experienced 
                                                          
8 Sociologist Georg Elwert claimed that the formation of migrants' own organizations helps them to get integrated into the 
receiving society. Binnenintegration (inner integration) is a term that describes the process of such organizational activities. 
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some fluctuations with the experiences of the group’s members being at times represented in social 
spaces. 
Despite the sporadic attempts to move the focus on Jewishness, the group faced the same problem as 
their former compatriots of German origin: they were claimed to be Russians. Kessler (2003) quotes a 
characteristic answer of one of her respondents, a 35-year-old geologist: "In Russia I was Jewish, and 
here I am Russian. I cannot say what I like more, as both [nominations] are negative". Thus, it can be 
argued that a negative notion of Russianness, embracing both Russlanddeutsche and Russophonic 
Jews, was constructed in Germany. Not simply coming from Russia, but having ‘Russian’ 
characteristics was stigmatized – as a result, the aim of getting rid of them (i.e. getting integrated) was 
formulated. 
Whereas the discourses on Russlanddeutsche and Russophonic Jews are quite structured, in German 
social spaces, tracing the discourses on ‘other Russophones’ turned out to be rather challenging. The 
group doesn't seem to be perceived as a one to discuss: strictly speaking, the 'Russian-issue' is 
indirectly referred to either through the discourses embracing two larger groups of the Russophones, or 
through the general debates on immigration. Thus, the German media discussed the possibility of 
attracting Russian IT-specialists when a broader topic of Green Cards for high-qualified immigrants 
was vital (Spiegel 2000) and criticized Russians who work as doctors when anti-immigration 
sentiments started growing in the 2010s (Scholz 2013). In this sense, these relatively new discourses 
resemble the ones that were previously used to refer to Turkish workers: the society indirectly claims 
that they are not here to stay. 
The final critical issue that I would like to address here, is the existence of internal divisions within the 
group. For instance, other Russophonic subgroups often accuse Russlanddeutsche of “getting the 
citizenship too easy”. Throughout the analyzed period Russophonic Jews were charged by their former 
compatriots with being supercilious, while Spätaussiedler were stereotypically treated as less educated 
people. Furthermore, all the groups have been expressing hostility towards Au Pair workers and the 
so-called “Russian wives”. 
Summing up, I claim that between the early 1990s and the mid-2010 two diverse groups – 
Russophonic repatriates and Jews – faced similar pressures. Both of them were accused of deceiving 
the German society by pretending to be non-Russian. Positive public representations of the group were 
insufficient; mass media generally associated them with high criminalization. The task of becoming 
‘integrated’ was set, where the term ‘integration’ functions as a typical empty signifier, i.e. a concept 
that might acquire different meanings depending on the context. Russlanddeutsche were expected to 
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get assimilated, while the Russophonic Jews were meant to dissolve within the Jewish community. The 
organizational activities of the Russophonic groups were strongly restrained by the described public 
expectations. 
5.2 Media representations of the Ukrainian conflict 
When analyzing the changes in the German media coverage of Russia associated with the Ukrainian 
crisis, Ahler (2016 : 132-133) comes to the conclusion that in 2014 the main focus shifted from Putin's 
person in both foreign and domestic policy to the conflict as a single topic. She writes that most 
German media shared a consensus on Russia's being responsible for the outbreak of the conflict. At the 
same time, she mentions a tide of criticism from the public that defined the dominating coverage as 
one-sided and biased. Counterbalancing this criticism, Ahler cites the report of the Federal Agency for 
Civic Education that demonstrated that the number of pro-Russian participants of German talk shows 
outweighed the number of pro-Ukrainian ones. 
Quite similarly to most other authors commenting on the media coverage of the Ukrainian crisis (cf. 
Nygren et. al. 2016), Ahler traces the main narratives outlining the image of the Ukrainian conflict. 
However, articles and videos devoted to the Ukrainian topic not only constitute the audiences’ 
perceptions of the corresponding events, but also frame their self-perceptions. Taking this thesis as a 
presupposition for my study, I formulate the following questions that function as my research 
guidelines: 
 What kinds of identities do German media discourses devoted to the Ukrainian events prescribe 
to Germans? Russians? Russophones?  
 What kinds of identities do Russian media discourses devoted to the Ukrainian events prescribe 
to the above-mentioned groups? 
An analysis of media coverage of the Ukrainian conflict is aimed at outlining the discourses 
dominating two main sociopolitical spaces that the Russophones in Germany might found themselves 
between. No attention here is given to other media spaces (e.g. European, Western, post-Soviet etc.), 
however, I fully recognize their potential and leave their analysis for future research. 
5.2.1 German media & the Ukrainian conflict 
The current section studies the key discourses on the Ukrainian crisis dominating the German media 
spaces. Although individual modes of representation differ, several main patterns can be traced. Thus, 
the German media either follow the 'humanitarian’ track and formulate the 'we-ness' through the role 
of a detached observer, or develop the 'general conflict' track that implies Germany's belonging to a 
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broader 'we-ness' (Western, European etc.). The ‘humanitarian’ track usually deals with the concept of 
‘an ‘intra-Ukrainian conflict’, where the Ukrainian events are interwoven into the chain of other 
‘overseas’ crises with limited importance for Germany. On the contrary, the ‘general conflict’ track 
unifies the Ukrainian crisis and other Moscow’s steps through the quilting point of ‘Russian 
aggression’. Depending on an individual mass-media, Germany might be represented either as one of 
the conflict sides, or as a potential victim. The second track is aimed at the mobilization of the 
audience, it applies emotive vocabulary and – similarly to the Russian-media discussed below – 
embraces multiple references to historical events, which might trigger misunderstandings between 
Russophones and the receiving society. Quite interestingly, a strong oppositional discourse, 
represented here by Junge Freiheit, doesn’t function as an echo of Russian dominant discourses. 
5.2.1.1 FOCUS online 
From the very beginning of the Ukrainian events (Maidan protests, disturbances, flight of President 
Yanukovych) FOCUS online formulated a consistent image of what was happening in the country. The 
sources of the conflict were initially connected with the Kremlin’s domestic policy and the personality 
of Vladimir Putin: 
(quoting the memoires of Vladimir Putin of his 1989 work in the GDR) “It was clear to me that 
the Soviet Union was ill. It was a fatal, incurable illness. A paralysis of power'. For the last 14 
years, he has done his best to overcome this paralysis. But not in the Western sense: not the 
absence of freedom, democracy and transparency were understood as the biggest mistakes of 
the Soviet Union, but the fact that the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev weakened the CPSU 
regime. [...] Demonstrations, disturbances – they  destroyed his world back in the GDR. And 
now they are back. In Kiev. On Maidan”. (Reitschuster 2014) 
The edition actively applies the narrative of a gap existing between the Russian authorities and people. 
The authorities are represented as formulating nearly fascist concepts of foreign policy, while the 
nation is paralyzed by the memories of Stalin's terror. Therefore, Ukraine is claimed to play an 
important symbolic role for Russia: Russians and Ukrainians have strong connections, and the 
democratization of Ukraine jeopardizes the “kleptocratic authoritarian system of power” in Russia 
(Umland 2015a). “Putin's Russia” is represented as an aggressive state that wages a hybrid war against 
Ukraine; the very definition of the Ukrainian events as a conflict or a civil war is rejected (ibidem). At 
the same time, the possibility of further escalation in Europe is evaluated as high (FOCUS online 
2016a) with limited security risks for the EU – e.g. associated with the nuclear objects in Ukraine 
(Umland 2015b). 
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FOCUS online is rather restrained when it comes to Kiev's own policy. For instance, an author 
mentions extreme right tendencies in the party landscape and notes that Russia bases its steps on the 
Ukrainian political mistakes, but also applies multiple fake images (Umland 2015a). Strictly speaking, 
the Ukrainian policy is only given residual attention of the newsmakers. Ukraine is never constituted 
as a part of ‘us’ that in case of FOCUS online seems to embrace the West. Thus, cognate words ‘pro-
Western’, ‘West-oriented’, ‘Western’, ‘West’ appear in most news blocks devoted to the Ukrainian 
events. By asserting the Western orientation of the Ukrainian government, the FOCUS journalists 
counterbalance the statement by recurrently citing the cultural closeness of Russia and Ukraine. 
Another interesting point: compared with other editions, FOCUS online almost avoids tying the 
Ukrainian crisis up with the Syrian events (rare exception – Umland 2016), and grounds the 
importance of selective cooperation with Russia in other regions (FOCUS online 2016). 
What, however, causes anxiety of the FOCUS journalists is the “propaganda offensive” that is claimed 
to be taken by Russia. FOCUS argues that multiple 'negative' tendencies in the Western political 
landscape (e.g. the election of Trump, activation of right forces in European countries and their 
growing popularity) have external reasons. For instance, journalists write that the situation with 
refugees is actively securitized by the Russian media – and therefore, it becomes an issue (cf. Focus 
online 2016b).  
Since the early 2016 FOCUS demonstrates a very critical attitude towards Russophones in Germany. 
The older generation of Russophones is defined as a 'lost' one; 20% of the Russlanddeutsche are called 
'badly integrated' that contradicts the data of the 2013 state-sponsored research (cf: Hufelschulte 2016; 
Worbs et. al. 2013). FOCUS argues: having poor linguistic competences, they receive a large portion 
of information from Russophonic sources – and turn into the champions of Kremlin's policy. 
Interestingly, the edition considers all the Russophones as constituting a common group 
(Haltaufderheide 2016) that was absent on the political scene, but now experiences an awakening.  
To the authors’ regret, Alternative für Deutschland, represented as a nationalist party, profited from 
this awakening. 'Russlanddeutsche often think in a quite nationalist manner' - quotes FOCUS an 
'insider', one of the representatives of the group. The repatriates are called a 'weapon against Merkel'; 
their presence in the German politics is characterized as abnormal, pressing the centrists out to the 
political periphery (ibidem). As it was done in 1990s, FOCUS works to obliterate an image of a good 
Russian(-speaker) out of the German sociopolitical space. Most articles issued for the last year mention 
Russians in negative external (e.g. 'How Russian made sport unattractive') and internal ('Russian mafia 
spreads across Germany') contexts. 
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All in all, the Ukrainian conflict is represented at two different levels by FOCUS. At the first level, 
that was constructed back in 2014, the Ukrainian events are represented as a hybrid war waged by an 
Other on Other’s territory. A German reader is prescribed with a role of a detached observer facing 
almost no security risks. At the second level, that was added in 2016, an idea of a propaganda 
campaign initiated by Russia and directed against the Western states is expressed. This time an Other 
is traced in the space that was previously defined as one’s own – which indicates that the discourse is 
no more constructed as an unchallengedly dominating one.  
5.2.1.2 Bild 
Being a tabloid, Bild presents information in a style typical for this kind of journalism. Thus, authors 
use loud headlines (e.g. “Putin must have bought Le Pen”, “Putinland is burnt to ashes”, “Economic 
crisis spoils Christmas to Russians”) and scandalous stories (e.g. an article devoted to the question of 
whether Putin might be a vampire) to attract the readers' attention. 
Whereas FOCUS reports are primarily based on othering non-German actors, Bild constructs the 
images of 'foes' in the internal sociopolitical space, too. Thus, the edition actively criticizes the policy 
of German foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier and recommends him put a reminder on the wall 
at his desk: “As those quiet men never become known, as they use soft tones to talk about brotherhood 
and peace, as they – similar to other dictators – always lay territorial claims 'for the last time', some of 
us believe their words and reconcile themselves with their aggressive tribes” (Reichelt 2017). The 
narrative of the ‘last territorial claims’ here functions as an implicit reference to the policy of Hitler’s 
Germany – which is a very sensitive topic for the German society. In fact, it might be interpreted as an 
appeal to a reader implying that a policy of appeasement would support further aggression. 
Another interesting reference to the events of the World War II is made when the short messages 
allegedly sent by Russians to the Ukrainian soldiers fighting in the East of the country, are discussed. 
The journalist quotes such a message: “Ukrainian fighters, you are like Germans near Stalingrad”. 
Interestingly, Bild repeats the words “you are like Germans” (without the reference to Stalingrad) once 
again in the middle of the article – this time in bold (Röpcke 2017c). Thus, although Bild demonstrates 
no solidarity with Ukraine as a pro-Western (democratic, European etc.) state, this case seems to be an 
attempt to represent both Ukrainians and Germans as (potential) victims of Putin’s policy.  
Paradoxically, Ukraine’s own policy almost disappears from the sphere of Bild’s attention – not 
without reason are some of the articles tagged as “Russia conflict” or “As in the Cold War” (e.g. 
Uhlenbroich 2016). What the journalists pay attention to instead, are the steps of “Tsar Putin” and 
Merkel as his political rival. The articles that bring the high politics closer to the earth, are usually 
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devoted to the separatists stigmatized as “Putin’s butchers” (cf. Röpcke 2016, 2017a, Bild 2016a). 
Thus, Bild elaborates no portraits of the direct victims of the conflict – which makes it rather easy for a 
reader to associate him- or herself with those ‘mythical’ people. The portraits of ‘Putin’s butches’, on 
the contrary, are quite detailed – and illustrated with multiple pictures and videos. 
According Bild, Putin’s actions in different regional and subject spheres should be considered as 
belonging to a common chain. Thus, the Russian president is claimed to wage a 'ruthless air warfare 
against hospitals and civilians' in Syria (Reichelt 2017). Other tags applied together with the Ukrainian 
one, include doping, Trump, Le Pen, AfD etc. Hard criticism is directed against “Putin’s propaganda 
war”. Unlike other editions, Bild analyses several articles and videos of Russian mainstream media in 
order to demonstrate how “propaganda” functions. For instance, when referring to the Channel 1 
video, Bild writes: “the moderator, who applies to millions of Russians every week, claims that 
Merkel has destroyed the policy of her outstanding forerunners [...] by her pro-American and anti-
Russian policy. Thus, Merkel acknowledges no more that without Russia's goodwill there would've 
been neither united Germany, nor united Europe” (Röpcke 2017b). The journalist calls the program 
deceitful (Lügen-Sendung) and criticizes its authors for racism, although no direct comments are given 
on some quotations (e.g. on the statement that Germany was trying to absorb Ukraine in order to 
expand its Lebensraum, and applied “the lie of democracy” for this aim). 
A refusal to disprove the narratives of a counter-discourse indicates the established dominance of the 
analyzed one. There’s no need to prove that the choice of Kiev was far from being a result of 
Germany’s occupying Mitteleuropa; the Bild’s audience already knows it. At the same time, Channel 
1 audiences (i.e. Russians) seem to be othered. But is it true for the Russian-speaking audiences in 
Germany?  
Citing the report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Bild writes that Russlanddeutsche belong to the 
groups especially susceptible to fake news (Bild 2016c). The conclusion is, quite logically, based on 
the demonstrations inspired by the 'Liza-case'9 in January 2016 (Bild 2016b). However, other cases are 
mentioned, too: when referring to the electoral campaign run by right party AfD among Russophones, 
Bild applies an unusual nominator German Russians (Kain 2016). For a society where the dominating 
nominator sounds as Russian Germans (Russlanddeutsche) and where the German component is 
emphasized, such a reversal must have a specific meaning: the members of the group are represented 
as Russians. 
                                                          
9 In January 2016 Russian media told a story of an alleged rape with Russophonic girl Liza being a victim. See more: 
Channel 1 
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The general position of the discourse (re)produced by Bild can be characterized as follows. It is based 
on othering both extra- and intra-German actors; where a quilting point (i.e. the concept that stands at 
the top of the discursive chain) can be characterized as ‘hidden truth’ or ‘justice’. The German 
information space is only criticized when being a part of the big Other’s invasion (e.g. Steinmeier 
believing that Russia can be cooperated with, or Russlanddeutsche protesting under the influence of 
Russian television), where the big Other is aggressive Putin’s Russia. Putin’s aggression is presented 
as pure, resting on no specific logic. 
5.2.1.3 Spiegel online 
Unlike other media that tend to prescribe Germans with a role of either detached observers, or 
potential victims of the conflict, Spiegel apparently tries to make its readers feel sympathy with people 
suffering at the battle line. Spiegel is actively humanizing the conflict by giving voice to the citizens 
living in destroyed areas and refugees (most of them – women). In 2016 the edition appealed to its 
readers calling them to make a donation so that a charitable foundation could provide Ukrainian 
pensioners with medicines (Mayer & Steffens 2016). Lots of attention is given to the international 
organizations working in the conflict area.  
Human rights violations from both sides are mentioned; only one of the articles openly recognizes that 
one of the sides could have committed more of them. Thus, a correspondent quotes an OBSE 
representative: “When it is written [in our report] that there was an outgoing fire from a specific 
position, it is clear, which side shot. But it is more difficult to tell who is guilty in every single case. 
Fire can be opened for the aims of defense [...] In 90% of cases separatists restrain us. We have a big 
problem to get to the Russia-Ukraine border. This indicates unambiguously: there's something there 
that the separatists hide” (Gathmann 2016). 
Another specific characteristic of Spiegel articles: after the initial 2014 attempts to represent the 
conflict as a Hitlerlike aggression of Putin (cf. Spiegel 2014a), the edition shifts to a more reserved 
vision. Spiegel authors try to trace a defensive logic behind Russia’s steps (Spiegel 2014b, 2016b) and 
recognize that Brussels thinks in geopolitical categories, too (Spiegel 2015). Although the Russian 
background doesn’t disappear from the conflict analysis, Spiegel makes a distinct accent on its intra-
Ukrainian character. Furthermore, Spiegel brings in Ukraine as an actor, and demonstrates that its 
domestic politics are far from being ideal. Thus, according to Spiegel, Ukrainians don't trust their 
allegedly corrupted government and buy arms to protect their families (Spiegel 2016a, 2017c). 
Compared with the above-mentioned media, Spiegel emphasizes the German component of the ‘we’ 
concept. Thus, the concepts of ‘West’, or ‘Europe’, or ‘the free world’ seem to give place to the 
56 
 
national identification. Merkel and Germany, represented as mediators in the conflict, are often 
mentioned in the articles devoted to the Ukrainian problematic. At the same time, an active inclusion 
of the humanitarian component makes a collective sense of Germany’s actorness more visible.  
The Ukrainian crisis seems to function as one of the steps on the way of Germany’s identity formation 
– and ultimately not the decisive one. Furthermore, the discursive binding of the Ukrainian crisis with 
further Russian steps on the international arena is not as straightforward, as by Bild. This peculiarity 
becomes especially evident when the Spiegel's comments on Russian mass media are analyzed. Thus, 
although Spiegel criticizes Russian media for distorting the information on the crisis (cf. Neef 2015, 
Bidder 2015), the narrative of all the actions being parts of a common plan is absent.  
2016 and 2017 have seen Spiegel accusing Russia of trying to deepen the intra-Western social splits 
(Spiegel 2017a). Apart from the comments on the report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs that calls 
the Russlanddeutsche one of the most unprotected groups in the situation of disinformation campaigns 
(Knaup & Traufetter 2016), Spiegel came up with a big video report on Russians in Germany.  
Compared with the 1990s absent or manifestly negative representations of the Russlanddeutsche, the 
report (Aden & Kreller 2016) provides an audience with an image of a ‘good’ repatriate. The 
characters play football, buy groceries and organize a district celebration – a great contrast with the 
1990s images of criminalized new-comers. However, the portrayal of a Russlanddeutscher in this 
video still differs from a normal representation of a German. Except for several details (such as a tablet 
in the interviewee’s hands appearing for several seconds in a 29-minute-long video), nothing indicates 
that the events in the video happen in 2016. The Spätaussiedler in the video seem to live an 
old-fashioned life with no computers on their working desks and television as the main source of 
information. Furthermore, only one of them is openly represented as a worker; at the same time, his 
work is inseparably linked with Russians. 5 out of 6 characters speak German with a heavy accent; all 
of them seem to be more oriented into the Russian (Soviet) past than in the German present. 
Interestingly, the Ukrainian problematic is only casually mentioned by the authors: thus, a group of 
Russlanddeutsche is told to gather in order to discuss the Ukrainian conflict in a pro-Russian manner.  
Once again, an image of an ‘effectively integrated’ repatriate is underrepresented in a German edition. 
The group is othered; its political concerns are claimed to be provoked by an external power. The 
political activation of the Spätaussiedler is discursively connected with the activation of the extreme 
right forces. In 2017 when describing an action of AfD candidate Elene Roon, who posted a picture of 
Hitler in her WhatsApp-Chatgroup with a caption “Lost since 1945. Adolf, please communicate with 
us! Germany needs you! German nation” (Spiegel 2017d), Spiegel emphasizes her belonging to the 
group of Russlanddeutsche, which wasn't made either by FOCUS, or by Bild. Another interesting 
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detail: Spiegel pays attention to the fact that some of the Russlanddeutsche can vote in Russia, too, 
which makes them potential electorate of Vladimir Putin (Amann & Lokshin 2016). 
5.2.1.4 ZDF 
Similar to their Spiegel colleagues, ZDF seems to give no special importance to the Ukrainian crisis: 
according to ZDF, this is just one of the events, not an outstanding one. What makes their approach 
special is the vocal discursive connection constructed between the Orange revolution and the Maidan 
events. Giving voices to Ukrainians (most of whom, however, live in the Western countries for several 
years and speak very good German), the channel represents both events as a continuous struggle for 
democracy and freedom (cf. ZDF 2014a, 2015, 2017a). “There can be no sovereign Ukraine without a 
Western idea, [...] and there will be no EU if Ukraine doesn't hold out in this war against Putin”, – 
argues one of the interviewees, thereby trying to represent Ukraine as a part of the endangered 
European ‘us’ (ZDF 2015).  
Taking ‘freedom’ as a quilting point, ZDF still doesn’t seem to share this statement of belonging. 
Although the Maidan protesters came out in defense of democracy and Western orientation, the 
government that came power has failed to overcome the crisis – claims ZDF (2016b). The channel 
implicitly demonstrates the similarities between the Russian and the Ukrainian societies, othering both 
of them. Moreover, it asks and answers the question of how the authoritarian tendencies in the region 
can be explained. Thus, ZDF prepared a 42-minute report on political orientation of young people in 
Russia. The 'Putin generation' is described as politically passive: most young people, according to the 
report, appreciate the rule of Vladimir Putin for giving them a chance to develop in a personal sphere 
and not to care for their social future (ZDF 2017b).  
Using the tacit consent inside the country, the Kremlin is trying to propagate its ideology outside the 
country. ZDF accuses Putin of constructing a 'net of extreme right friends' all over Europe that 
embraces such forces as Front National (France), Vlaams Belang (Belgium), Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (Austria) and Jobbik (Hungary). In Germany Kremlin supports the activities of several 
groups hostile towards foreigners (PEGIDA, AfD, NPD). An interesting detail: when an AfD 
functionary is asked whether his party is sponsored by Russia, he answers 'definitely not' and nods. 
Claiming to “fill the information vacuum” and protect the freedom of speech, Moscow wages an 
information war – asserts ZDF. Thereby the channel stigmatizes the alternative visions of Russian 
media as conscious distortions and propaganda. Moreover, a mistrust towards 'non-political' activities 
of Russia is fueled by representing the Tolstoy Institute musical evenings as meetings of right radicals 
(ZDF 2016a). 
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Unlike key printed editions, ZDF makes an attempt to give voice to those who see the Ukrainian 
events differently. For instance, the journalists interview a man living in the areas occupied by 'pro-
Russian separatists', who claims that he doesn't want to live in Ukraine anymore after the attacks of the 
Ukrainian army (ZDF 2017c). Another example: along with the Ukrainians living Europe, ZDF 
interviews a German journalist who thinks that it is important to understand the logic of Putin instead 
of demonizing him: 
…we, the audience, the readers of newspapers and TV-viewers, are shown a black-and-white 
film that accuses Putin of all the negative things that happen. But the reality is not a black-and-
white film. We, the West, also have our own interests... It is always represented as if all we 
want is democracy, freedom and human rights, while Putin would like to expand his empire, is 
aggressive and thirsts for war. But it doesn't correspond to the reality (ZDF 2014b). 
However, in both cases the alternative impetus of the interviewees’ words is neutralized by the 
journalist’s comments. Thus, in the first case the words of a man are represented as a part of ‘usual 
mutual accusations’ of the conflicting side, while second speaker inevitably faces the questions 
contracting his point of view (e.g. “What makes the position of Putin wrong?”). 
5.2.1.5 Junge Freiheit  
The general tone of the right paper Junge Freiheit differs from the manner typical for mainstream 
German media. Whereas the latter stigmatize attempts to understand Putin, Junge Freiheit claims to 
search for deeper reasons of the Ukrainian crisis associated with both Western and Russian political 
steps: 
According to Western-American point of view, Russia bears the responsibility for the 
escalation of the Ukrainian conflict to an undeclared war; according to Russian point of view, 
the West does [...]. A hundred years after the World War I, one should spread [the idea] that 
there can be no sole initiator of a war; that the more convinced the political and military elites 
of the conflicting powers are that they are the only right side [...], the easier it is for a local 
conflict to turn into a comprehensive collision (Paulwitz 2014) 
The paper openly gives platform to such 'Putin-verstehers'10 as John Mearsheimer who openly lays the 
blame for the Ukrainian conflict on the West (Junge Freiheit 2014). Furthermore, Junge Freiheit 
supports the thesis that was recurrently repeated by the Russian authorities when it came to the 
discussion on sanctions: economic issues should be perceived as more fundamental than political ones 
                                                          
10 From German verb ‘verstehen’ – to understand 
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(Fasbender 2016d). Finally, the mass medium seems to recognize that Crimea de-facto belongs to 
Russia, and reproduces the claim that the Minsk process is currently frozen because of Kiev’s rigidity 
(Fasbender 2016b). 
However, the concept of ‘we-ness’ formulated by the paper, apparently doesn’t embrace Russia. 
According to Junge Freiheit, Russia should be understood (Fasbender 2016a), but still kept at a 
distance. ‘Russian bears’ are talked of as an Other thinking in practices categories, while Europe is 
'turning up its nose' and losing 'on all fronts' (Fasbender 2016c). Thus, in terms of IR theory, the 
concept suggested by the paper can be interpreted as a need to return to a realist foreign policy that is 
allegedly already pursued by Russia. Such a policy implies that there can be no stable ‘we-ness’, but a 
plurality of changing alliances. 
Although the paper is associated with the AfD party that is often referred to as a force supported by 
Russophones in Germany, no specific references are made to the group. Quite the contrary, the mass 
medium challenges this connection by adducing the statistics claiming that only 4,7% of the 
Spätaussiedler support Alternative für Deutschland (Junge Freiheit 2016). 
5.2.2 Russian media & the Ukrainian conflict 
Similarly to the previous subchapter, this section deals with media representations of the Ukrainian 
conflict – this time, with Russian ones. Whereas the German mainstream discourses formulate an 
image of 'attacking Russia', Russian mass media construct the story of ‘aggressive West’ that 
disrespects Moscow’s interests and challenges its diverging choices. One of the key quilting points 
here is 'the truth' – a typical empty signifier filled with specific content. Thus, 'the truth' – whenever 
this nomination refers to historical events or current political choices – is often represented as 
something that should be protected by the common efforts of the 'we-community'.  
Two main strategies are applied by the mainstream media following this track: they either give 
exhaustive information (often presented by multiple experts) on controversial points, or emotively 
denounce the proponents of different points of view. The application of such instruments can galvanize 
Russian-speaking communities in Western countries, as it is obviously based on othering the 
corresponding societies. However, the unifying concept of ‘truth’ is only based on positivity in its part 
oriented into the past, while the present-day content is primarily formulated through negativity. As a 
result, no clear prospects for Russophonic ‘truth-seekers’ can be traced. At the same time, liberal 
oppositional discourses, represented here by Ekho Moskvy, are strongly oriented at praising the 
Western choices and values, which might limit their potential among ‘othered’ Russophones in 
European countries. 
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5.2.2.1 Channel 1 
The way Channel 1 represents the Ukrainian conflict, differs from manner typical for the most popular 
German media. Differences can be found in the style used by the journalists. Whereas non-tabloid top 
German media avoid emotive vocabulary, Channel 1 reports abound in words holding specific 
connotations. Thus, certain understandings are created by the usage of such words as “ukropy” 
(scornful for ‘Ukrainian patriot’) and “pravoseki” (scornful for 'members of the Ukrainian far-right 
party Pravyj Sektor' prohibited in Russia), as well as through the stigmatization of the Ukrainian policy 
as “neo-Nazism”, “fascism” and “witch-hunt” (cf. Pervyi kanal 2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015d). 
Using an image of a ‘fascist attack’, Channel 1 constructs a similarity between the pro-Russian fighters 
in Eastern Ukraine (nominated as “opolchency”, i.e. members of people's volunteer corps) and those 
who fought against the aggression of Nazi Germany during the Great Patriotic War. Not without 
reason has the Georgian ribbon, previously associated with the Victory Day, become a symbol of 
Antimaidan activists (Pervyi kanal 2014c). The “Ukrainian nationalists” (this signifier is usually 
applied to describe either the Ukrainian army, or the members of private/voluntary militias fighting 
against the pro-Russian groups in Eastern Ukraine) are told to abuse drugs and, therefore, demonstrate 
groundless aggression towards the civilians (Pervyi kanal 2017). Quite symptomatically, the same 
narrative of using drugs’ was applied by another top Russian channel – Rossiya 24 – when describing 
the Maidan events (Rossiya 24 2017). 
This metaphor of Ukrainians’ being physically misled resonates with a wider narrative defining the 
country’s role in the international relations. Channel 1 seems to portray the USA as a master of 
Ukraine that doesn’t really care for the countries’ citizens, and is going to abandon it when this burden 
becomes too heavy (cf.  Pervyi kanal 2015b, 2015e). Whereas the German media make an accent on 
the military aspect of the conflict, Channel 1 makes an attempt to document a ‘state failure’. 
Sometimes the very sustainability of the post-Soviet Ukrainian state is brought into a question. “In 
Russia – even in the worst years of the 1990s – the state existed as a self-defying value, and our 
oligarchs positioned themselves against this background. In Ukraine, there was no state, apart from 
those oligarchs” – claims journalist Leont'ev (Pervyi kanal 2015a). 
In this scheme, Russia is represented as an actor that ‘saves’ Ukraine. Unlike its German colleagues, 
Channel 1 emphasizes the collective character of Russia’s actorness. Russia (not personally Putin, but 
Russia in general) provides the Eastern Ukraine with the humanitarian aid, receives refugees and 
seriously ill patients (cf. Pervyi kanal 2014d, 2015f). All those people seem to be defined as belonging 
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to ‘us’ – as well as common Ukrainians in general. However, the borders of ‘we-ness’ constructed by 
Channel 1 are quite vague. It lacks positivity, but follows a unification-through-negativity track.  
The big Other can be traced in the image of the West. At the same time, Channel 1 clearly emphasizes 
that there is a difference between the USA (an absolute Other) and Europe (a relative Other). A 
dialogue with the latter is both possible and desirable; Europe is represented as a confused actor that is 
unaware of the real state of affairs (Pervyi kanal 2015c). 
Although the accent on former compatriots definitely gives way to a more general appeal to an 
indefinite group of 'truth-seekers' in Channel 1 reports, at least one reference to Russophones in 
Germany is worth being mentioned. Thus, in January 2016 Channel 1 came up with a report (Pervyi 
kanal 2016) on an alleged rape of a Russian-speaking girl in Germany, thereby provoking 
demonstrations among the members of the group. Leaving the question of whether the demonstrations 
were paid by the Russian governmental structures outside the brackets, I would like to refer to the 
textuality of this item. Several observations might be made here. First, the citizenship of the girl is not 
mentioned; further reaction of the Russian Minister of foreign affairs makes the audience believe she 
might have a Russian pass. Secondly, the text is based on the double-othering: (1) cultural othering of 
the «barbaric East» condensed around the image of a refugee and (2) othering of the German state that 
cannot be relied on. Therefore, Channel 1 skillfully bypasses the issues of any specific Russian cultural 
identification (no matter whether the girl believes she is Russian, German or Russlanddeutsche – we all 
face the common threat), but challenges the established institutional (i.e. civic) identification. Such an 
approach reveals a broader character of the hegemonic intervention that constructs a preferable image 
of a state as a protector. 
5.2.2.2 Rossiya 1 
The manner that Rossiya 1, the second largest TV channel in Russia, discusses the Ukrainian events 
resembles the instruments applied by Channel 1. Similarly to their colleagues, Rossiya 1 reporters 
make an accent on emotional representations. Metaphoric constructions that they tend to introduce 
(“[Ukraine] is sinking as a giant ship, but there are petty intrigues at the upper deck” (Rossiya 1 
2014c); “the plague of Kiev chaos is spreading throughout the country” (Rossiya 1 2014b) are aimed at 
both demonizing and debasing the revolutionary forces in Kiev. What the channel suggests its 
audience to be afraid of, is an abstract revolution in general and the instability generated by it. 
However, the individuals standing at the top of the Ukrainian state are represented as weak and unable 
to control the forces got awakened: 
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“The tragedy of Ukraine consists in its geographical and spiritual collapse, but also [in the fact 
that] what has remained of this state is now ruled by external forces. There are, in fact, no 
people [in the government of the country] who can take decisions independently” (Rojkov 
2014) 
Furthermore, the journalists come up with criticism directed against the alleged initiator of the crisis – 
the United States. Ukraine is claimed to be “Obama's mistake” and failed project similar to the Syrian 
one (Rossiya 1 2016b). Thus, following the logic elaborated by its Channel 1 colleagues, Rossiya 1 
tells a story of the aggressive USA and emphasizes the role of Obama as a 'weak and inconsistent 
leader'. The narrative of the “state failure” can be traced in the channel’s items, too. The reporters 
apply multiple historical comparisons: parallels are constructed between the Ukrainian crisis and the 
1917 Russian revolution or the collapse of the Soviet Union (Rossiya 1 2014a). In all the cases, 
revolutionary forces supported by some external sponsors are claimed to have 'leveled at the regime 
and hit the country'. 
Ukraine is represented as a part of a larger ‘territory of chaos’. In some territories, this chaos is 
claimed to be brought by ill-considered US military actions (as in Libya and Syria), while in others it 
is explained though the concept of erroneous liberal ideas (refugee crisis in Europe). Visual and audial 
instruments are applied to create an atmosphere of anxiety when those territories are mentioned (cf. 
Rossiya 1 2016c).  
Quite the contrary, Russia is constituted as a stronghold of stability. The collective ‘we-ness’ 
formulated by Rossiya 1, is based on the idea of having no democratic illusions. Special importance is 
given to military values as a basis of the state’s prosperity; those who privilege other types of values 
are either stigmatized, or accused of lying (Rossiya 1 2015b). At some points the military rhetoric 
might sound rather aggressive. Thus, Dmitry Kiseljov came up with a claim that “Russia is the only 
country in the world that can turn the USA into radioactive ashes” which was afterwards actively 
discussed by Western media (Rossiya 1 2014b). However, the items are generally oriented at internal 
audiences; as such, they do not express a threat to an external force, but construct the idea of a strong 
government’s hand that would prevent chaos from entering ‘our’ space. 
As the quilting point (the privileged sign) of the discourse might be formulated as internal stability, 
non-Russian viewers are rarely referred to. Two main types of items mentioning Russophonic 
communities outside Russia can be observed: (1) dealing with the narrative of unheard minorities in 
collapsing Europe (e.g. Rossiya 1 2016a); (2) praising those who have strong political identification 
with Russia – for instance, those fighting in Eastern Ukraine (Rossiya 1 2015a). The former seems to 
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encourage different Russophonic groups to keep the idea of ‘disillusionment’, while the latter can 
hardly be called an instrument of massive recruitment: such videos are quite rare. 
5.2.2.3 Rossiya 24 
Unlike Channel 1, news channel Rossiya 24 tries to distance itself from the most emotional comments 
on the Ukrainian events. Compared with non-tabloid German colleagues, Rossiya 24 still abuses 
sensational headlines (e.g. “Atrocities of Ukrainian chastisers: Russia demands investigation of 
Donbass war crimes” or “Human shield: Ukrainian military doesn't let people out of Debaltsevo 
pocket” (Rossiya 24 2014, 2015). Nevertheless, the general tone of the dialogue between the channel 
and its audience differs from that of Channel 1. Thus, Channel 1 speaks with its audience as equals; 
colloquial vocabulary and sarcastic phrases both work to create an image of a 'silly Other' who doesn't 
understand the obvious truth. As a result, most characters in Channel 1 reports are common people. 
Rossiya 24 follows a different track: when commenting on the Ukrainian crisis, it interviews experts 
and officials who are claimed to possess exclusive knowledge. When people with radical points of 
view are given voice, the channel tries to distance itself from them (e.g. Rossiya 24 2017).  
Reports are always full of details and multiple; even in 2017 some days witness 3 and more Ukrainian 
reports being issued. Compared with the German media that only make a sketchy description of the 
Ukrainian events, Rossiya 24 reports seem to be more effective in representing their views as a ‘broad 
picture’. The information is given in a way that marks it as ‘objective’ – and the inevitable 
interpretations are more implicit than by the German media. However, there is at least one method that 
makes the interpretative part of the reports visible: similar to Channel 1, Rossiya 24 stigmatizes the 
Ukrainian state as fascist. The comparison of the today’s events with the Great Patriotic War reaches 
its peak when the journalists interview a veteran of the war who claims that he saw the current 
Ukrainian heroes wearing fascist uniform near Stalingrad. “Today the Ukrainian history needs to be 
protected. When the black is represented as white, and enemies are celebrated as heroes. When the 
Georgian ribbon, a symbol of victory over fascism, is called a sign of aggression. And a swastika is 
demonstrated in the center of Kiev, at Sofia square” – concludes the journalist (Rossiya 24 2016). 
Thus, once again a Russian mass medium is (re)producing an image of Russia as a guardian of the 
truth. Nevertheless, in this case the ‘we’ concept is formulated more precisely. Special attention is 
given to the idea of ‘Russkii mir’ based on both ethnic and linguistic commonality. Quoting the 
speeches of Vladimir Putin, Konstantin Kosachev and Sergey Lavrov made during the Congress of 
compatriots, Rossiya 24 outlines the following two key concepts: (1) in a situation when an anti-
Russian 'information war' is led, the compatriots might become a part of our winning a 'geopolitical 
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game' and (2) people outside Russia should be sure that we would protect their interests (Rossiya 24 
2015).  
In 2014 when the Ukrainian conflict was about to reach its peak, Rossiya 24 told the stories of former 
compatriots who came from the countries of Western Europe (including Germany) to “write the truth 
about the war” for the European audience. “I feel so mournful about the events happening here, 
Russians are being killed”; “This is my land, these are my people. When they are hurt, I am hurt, too” 
– say the returnees (Rossiya 24 2014). Thus, in both reports the former compatriots are encouraged to 
keep the solidarity with ‘Russkii mir’ (with Ukraine being an integral part thereof) and resist the 
aggression started by outer forces against Russia. This case demonstrates, how differently the 
Ukrainian events might be perceived. Rossiya 24 intertwines them into the chain of equivalence 
defined as ‘Western offensive against Russia’, while FOCUS represents a group of media that 
advocates a contrary position: an offensive was initiated by Russia in order to destabilize the West. 
A German viewer might also pay attention to a specific role prescribed to Germany in the discourse 
(re)produced by Rossiya 24. Whereas the West (the USA plus the EU) is generally described in 
negative terms, Germany is holding a privileged position. An interesting example thereof can be found 
in the comments on Germany’s reaction to the ‘Liza case’ Thus, Steinmeier accused Lavrov of 
intervention into internal affairs and advised Russian authorities to avoid using the situation “for the 
aims of propaganda”. Rossiya 24 gives an unexpectedly moderate reaction, claiming that although 
Steinmeier gave in to emotions, he has good relations with Lavrov, and the close ties between Russia 
and Germany are still kept in place (Rossiya 24 2016). At the same time, the alleged ‘close ties’ don’t 
prevent the channel from (re)producing the discourse of Russians in Germany being ignored (e.g. 
Rossiya 24 2016). 
5.2.2.4 Ekho Moskvy 
The discourses (re)produced by oppositional radio-station Ekho Moskvy differ from those typical for 
state-owned media. Although certain characteristics liken them to those of Western media – for 
instance, the authors claim that Kremlin pursues an aggressive policy both in Ukraine and in the 
Middle East to suppress discontent in Russia (Veller 2017) – the station makes different accents when 
discussing Ukraine. Whereas the leading German media approach foreign politics as an independent 
sphere, Ekho Moskvy refuses to analyze it independently from internal issues.  
For both the guests and journalists of the station, the matter of the Ukrainian crisis consists in the 
infringed freedom of speech in Russia. The attack on this freedom is said to be based on two main 
mechanisms. First, asserts Ekho Moskvy, the TV propaganda is 'zombifying' their compatriots and, 
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therefore, leading to a general degradation of the Russian society (Zhuravleva & Gusarov 2016). 
Unlike some of their German colleagues, Ekho Moskvy journalists avoid dismantling individual TV 
items. Their criticism is formulated in general phrases; a member of a ‘we’ collective is represented as 
a person who shouldn’t be explained why those videos are falsified.  
Secondly, thoughtful and critical citizens (i.e. ‘we’ as formulated by Ekho Moskvy) are claimed to face 
unprecedented pressure that prevents them from expressing divergent points of view (Larina 2014, 
Petrovskaya & Larina 2014). “Russia is leaving the track to civilization that all the world is following. 
Russia is staying alone” – concludes one of the guests (Parkhomenko 2015). In this sense, ‘we-ness’ is 
associated with the Western choice and understandings similar to European ones. At the same time, 
militaristic values praised by other journalists are represented in a negative way (Ekho Moskvy 2017). 
The station makes a unique type of references to Russophonic communities, including the 
Russophones in Germany. Thus, it gives voice to people who claim that “90% of [Russophones] 
managed to get used to the new reality' and their growing political activities are a consequence of a 
'growing civic consciousness” (Nemtsova 2017). Interestingly, this normalization of the group is added 
by an assertion that the situation in Germany (and Europe in general) is far from being as complicated 
as described by Russian media. Once again, Russophonic Germans are represented as having an 
immunity to 'Putin's propaganda'. Thus, no more than 15% of them are said to share Russian 
understandings of the 'Liza case' (Naryshkin 2016) 
5.2.2.5 RT (Russia Today) 
Accused of being one of the most dangerous instruments of 'hostile propaganda' (RT 2016a), RT 
follows a track different from that of the mainstream Russian media, when it comes to discussing the 
situation in Ukraine. Emotional vocabulary, typical for such media as Channel 1 or Rossiya 1, gives 
way to more reserved descriptions based on expert comments. However, the total amount of technical 
details is several times smaller than that provided by Rossiya 24 – in this sense, the RT ‘we-ness’ is 
based on being immune to falsification, rather than knowing all the facts. 
RT claims to play a role of a mass medium that gives voice to those telling an inconvenient truth. 
Thus, it often comes up with reprints of critical articles issued by Western mass media (cf. RT 2016b, 
2016c, 2016f) and leads it often campaign unmasking anti-fake forces. For instance, RT demonstrates 
that the Ukrainian Stopfake.org website is financed by the British and American governments (RT 
2016d). 
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The whole concept of information warfare is inserted into a more general narrative describing the East-
West conflict: 
Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union an unofficial East-West confrontation has never lost 
its urgency. It has become obvious recently, when the situation in Ukraine made NATO return 
to its 'keep the Russians out, the Americans in, and the Germans down' rhetoric. [...] NATO is, 
above all, a military alliance of the Western civilization. (RT 2014) 
In this case, Russia’s leaving the Western track of development that was criticized by Ekho Moskvy, is 
represented as a normal state of affairs. Russia has never been a part of the West, claims RT, and the 
Ukrainian crisis has only made it obvious. Similarly to Ekho Moskvy and the German mainstream 
media, RT sees the Russian agenda as the key one in the Ukrainian crisis; discussing Ukraine, thus, 
means referring to Russia. Nevertheless, the stream of information that it provides, is far less limited 
than by most Western media: in 2014 and 2015 the media published more than 5 articles on the 
Ukrainian topic a day. 
At least one important characteristic differs RT from all the Russian mainstream media. Thus, RT 
platform embraces InoTV, a mass medium that publishes reprints of articles issued in Western states. 
Sometimes the latter represent views different from the channel's position, however, no refuting 
comments are given (cf. InoTV 2015a, 2015b, 2016b). Such an approach might be quite effective in 
providing an effect of truth. The channel represents its position in a way that doesn’t require strong 
words to be defended; giving opposing opinions without arguments against is already a strong claim. 
As for the Russophones in Germany, no specific references are made to this group. The 'Liza case' is 
mentioned in a very restrained manner, most comments concentrate on the official position of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (RT 2016g). At the same time, the narrative of 
internal splits in Germany is applied. RT asserts that more and more people in Germany feel unheard 
by the politicians and the Russophonic community is just one of the politically invisible groups that 
are, quite logically, attracted by the right forces (RT 2016c, 2016e, InoTV 2016a). 
5.3 Russophones’ identities during the Ukrainian crisis 
After giving a general characteristic of a discursive background that was formed during the Ukrainian 
crisis, the question of influence that it (might) have had on the Russophones in Germany can be raised 
again. Thus, my analysis has demonstrated that the group faces an intensive discursive pressure 
exerted by multiple and often conflicting sides. In the most general sense, the narrative dominating 
within the German-language societal space can be formulated as ‘attacking Russia’, where the 
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Ukrainian events are represented as a part of a general Kremlin’s aggression carried out on multiple 
fronts. Therefore, ‘we-ness’ in its different variations is formulated on the basis of ‘othering’ Russia. 
Whenever openly referred to, Russophones in Germany are represented as Kremlin’s (potential) allies, 
who consciously avoided being integrated and now gravitate towards destructive forces supported by 
Moscow.  
On the contrary, the discourse of mainstream Russophonic media is structured by the concept of 
‘justice’. Telling their audiences a story of ‘aggressive West’ that disrespects Russia’s interests and 
challenges its diverging choices, Russian mainstream media refer to an indefinite group of ‘justice-
seekers’ that also includes former compatriots. The narrative of Russophones’ being unheard in their 
states is applied, too. Consequently, I can assume that the mainstream Russian media indirectly 
encourage Russophonic communities to search for alternative forces that would heed their voices and 
their truths. However, the main audience of the Russian mainstream media is, quite logically, an 
internal one. Here the incumbent government is constructed as a defender of ‘justice’ and stability, 
while the Western countries are represented as a territory of chaos. 
The discourses dominating in Russian and German sociopolitical spaces are being added and 
challenged by other discursive formations: e.g. by the oppositional discourses circulating in the 
respective countries. For instance, the Russophonic discourses of this type challenge the claim that the 
Russian government defends the truth; to a certain extent, the narratives that they reproduce are 
consonant with the dominant German ones, but with a specific reference to the Russian audience. 
Unlike Russian oppositional discourses that make an attempt to include Western countries into the 
common ‘we-ness’, German oppositional discourses are primarily based on othering Russia. Thus, 
although certain models of Russia’s policy are evaluated as worth being followed, their ‘we-ness’ is 
still formulated on a German basis. 
Before proceeding to the identification issues, I would like to once again emphasize a limited character 
of my analysis. Thus, Russophones are the group that embraces people coming from several post-
Soviet states. As a result, their national identifications and the sources of information they rely on, 
might not be associated with Russia. Furthermore, the group is influenced by representations 
formulated at subnational, supranational and global level. When drawing specific conclusions on 
identification processes, I assume that Russophonic and German discourses play the key role in their 
construction. Therefore, introducing additional discursive layers might constitute a basis of further 
research. 
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After holding a set of interviews and analyzing the Russophonic social communication spaces (e.g. 
online spaces with user-generated contents, printed media and materials of organized communities), I 
found out several tendencies characterizing the patterns of identification of the Russophonic 
community during the Ukrainian crisis. To begin with, a dividing line between Russians and 
Ukrainians is being constructed. Whereas before 2014 the Ukrainian ‘we-ness’ was mostly 
(re)produced by the Ukrainian-speaking communities (cf. Hata skraju), the beginning of the conflict 
has brought the idea of internal differences into the Russophonic ones. It should be noted that although 
those divisions are formally defined in ethnical terms, the dichotomies that they constitute, are often 
non-ethnical. Interviewee Andrej (36, ethnic Ukrainian) implicitly raises this issue: 
“There are Russians in Germany who are very good people, and there are those who watch one 
channel – for [such a person] we, Ukrainians, are wrong when we try to remove our corrupted 
government”.  
Answering the question of whether he faced any hostility in Germany because of speaking Russian, 
Victor (25, originally comes from Donezk), told me a story of politically inspired misunderstandings 
with his former compatriot: 
“When I was a student, there was a guy from Kiev, one year younger...he avoided having 
contacts with people from Russia, including me and another guy from Donetsk. I think it 
happened because of politics, as when we started to contact I realized that he shared quite 
anti-Russian views”. 
Similar idea of a new Ukrainianness being constructed as a political concept can be traced in the 
significant online comment of Olga, a Ukrainian Russophone living in Germany: 
Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes! I was born at Poltavshchyna [...]. I have been living in 
Germany for almost 20 years and bemoaning my country, looking at it from the outside. [...] 
When I emigrated in the hard 1990s, we were afraid of expressing our opinions when queueing 
for sugar and butter. We were persecuted by the police, drained by racketeers [...] Nothing has 
changed for the last 20 years! Everything has become more expensive and horrifying! Your 
vision11 must have lost sharpness if you don't see [what] you live in, [whom] you obey! It is an 
exploit that people decided to rise against those tyrants! (Schapovalova 2014). 
Thus, in all the cases we can trace how the Ukrainianness is formulated through othering 'Russianness', 
'Sovietness' or 'non-Westerness'. It this case 'Russianness' (or any other variation of this concept) is 
                                                          
11 Here the commentator is referring to the author of a personal blog, a writer living in Russia  
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often perceived as a phenomenon transcending the state borders and embracing the opposition to 
modernization. At least some of the Russophones are thought of as the bearers of these ideas – and 
therefore represented in a negative way. An anecdote about a Ukrainian who refused to eat a cake 
brought by a Russian is circulating both in Russia and among Russophones living outside the country – 
and in both cases, it gathers lots of ‘likes’, indicating the existing tensions (e.g. Podlushano Germaniya 
2016b, 2017). 
An analysis of comments in the main social networks demonstrates that the ‘Ukrainian’ posts usually 
attract a number of ‘supervisors’ who seem to either consolidate the dominating discourses, or 
reinforce the group’s ties with the oppositional ones. In the most general sense, those commentators 
can be characterized as follows: (1) they indicate either Ukraine or Russia (in some cases – the Baltic 
states) as a country of origin in their profiles; (2) their comments are aimed at shaming the 
interlocutors for the opinions they express; (3) an effect of shaming is multiplied by the application of 
words with deep emotional connotations.  
A significant example of a supervising comment can be found in Poslushano Germaniya public page 
on Vkontakte platform: 
...I was born in Ukraine, and we lived in Ukraine, and then some people came and told us: 
“There's no more Ukraine here, it is Luhansk People's Republic”, and I have to go and fight for 
the LPR, and tomorrow the Whites will come and say that it is their territory, and then the Reds 
will come, and then the Greens [...] Would I have to fight for all of them? [...] This emigration 
cattle who was given a chance to come to Germany, they think they are Aryans. You are 
refugees, but [it was easier for you] to get here. So, don't forget who you are and where you 
come from. And when German taxpayers start thinking they are Russian patriots – I cannot stop 
laughing (Podlushano Germaniya 2016a) 
Comments indicating the belonging of concrete users to any organized communities are quite rare in 
social networks (an example motivating people to participate in a pro-Russian demonstration: Russkie 
v Germanii ot 16 do 25 : 2014). On the contrary, printed media demonstrate more evidence of being 
connected with some organized ‘supervising’ structures. A visible contrast between different issues of 
'Berlinskii Telegraf', a Russophonic paper published in Germany, gives certain grounds to think that 
the edition belongs to this category.  
Thus, the first issue printed in 2014 draws a parallel between the Winter War of 1939-1940 and the 
current Ukrainian crisis. The author applies titles with specific connotations (e.g. “Helsinki - the 
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mother of Russian cities”, “Crimean variant”, “Finnish Izvarino”) and transmits the narrative of 
habitual Russian lie. Furthermore, Russia is represented as the USSR that has changed the name, while 
the latter is recurrently compared with Nazi Germany. “The USSR take out the equipment of 
concentration camps [...] The equipment from Germany is still massively used by Russian enterprises, 
however, it is unknown whether the German equipment from concentration camps is still applied in 
Russian prisons”. (Berlinskii Telegraf 2014 : 4-5, 11) 
The same issue tries to expose the Russian representations of the “Slavyansk drama” by attacking the 
heroic images of the fighters: “using the fleeting high feelings of impressionable population, a group of 
people captures the town and all its businesses. This all is made under the pretense of protection. [...] 
but the heroes have a specific manner of fighting – they hide behind perambulators and hospitals” 
(ibidem : 12). The first five issues of the paper publish advertisements calling to donate to the 
Ukrainian refugees and soldiers (Berlinskii Telegraf 2014 : 21; 2015a : 26). However, the 6th issue 
marks a radical change in the editor's policy. It starts with an interview with the Russian Consul, 
wherein the interviewer calls the comparison between the ideologies of Nazi Germany and the USSSR 
“absurd” (Berlinskii Telegraf 2015b : 8). Pro-Ukrainian materials that could be found in all the 
previous issues disappear; none of them can be read in further issues either. In 2016 Berlinskii 
Telegraf once again comes up with an article “prepared in cooperation with the Russian Consulate” 
(2016 : 12-13). At the same time, this young paper experiences a great de-politicization and returns to 
the topics typical for the Russophonic media printed in Germany: healthcare, entertainment, local 
services etc. Such a radical change can be interpreted as a sign of direct intervention from the Russian 
side. 
Aimed at reproducing the transboundary solidarity (i.e. constructing state-transcending chains of 
equivalence), such steps might, however, induce the growing feeling of insecurity among the members 
of the group. For instance, interviewee Marina (47, Russlanddeutsche) expressed her fears in the 
following way: 
“I know that Russophones are afraid here, because you can face difficulties finding a job, if the 
information leaks out”. 
In a certain sense, the representatives of the group do share the narrative of 'intervening Russia' that 
controls the events far behind its borders – a narrative that is actively reproduced by the German media 
(cf. FOCUS online, Bild, Spiegel online). Although the respondents often refute this notion, their 
behavior indicates the opposite. The respondents break off the phrases when they feel that their words 
might have harmful consequences. More than 70% of my interview requests weren’t answered at all; 
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several respondents revoked their consent right before the interview. Some cases of unexpected refusal 
followed when the German media published a sensational information that the Turkish Secret Service 
was spying on its citizens living in Germany (for details see: Spiegel 2017b) – although the connection 
of those refusal with the mentioned events is still to be proved. 
The insecurity is deepened by the intra-group ‘supervision’ that can be observed in social spaces, too. 
Here one of the most frequent types of the comments embraces the narrative ‘the Ukrainian events 
shouldn’t concern us’. A typical comment can be found in a Russophonic group under a video devoted 
to Ukraine: 
“This group is for Russophones in Germany...and this fellow appeared here with a video to 
aggravate people again!” (Zhivyom v Germanii - Novosti i Politika 2016) 
One of my interview requests in Vkontakte was reacted to in a similar way: 
“The Russian population of Germany [doesn't care] what kind of conflicts happen in Ukraine, 
Kenia or Alpha Centauri” (Podlushano Germaniya 2017). 
Thus, an attempt to establish some kind of inner discipline within the group is made. Those who 
transmit this narrative, function as the consolidators of ‘Germanness’ within the group of the 
Russophones. Unlike those who work to establish transboundary chains of equivalence, internal 
‘supervisors’ avoid temporal references with the past: what does matter, according to them, is the 
German present. The paradox of such comments consists in the background they are written against. 
An overwhelming majority of the commentators participating in online discussions devoted to 
Ukraine, seem to be highly engaged with the topic. Moreover, in some spaces (especially in groups 
located within Odnoklassniki website) such discussions attract more commentators than others.  
An interesting step towards conciliating the existing interest to the Ukrainian topic and the task of 
reinforcing the political identification with Germany, was made by ‘Russkaya Germaniya’ paper. 
Along with publishing the letters of their readers embracing contrary points of view (e.g. Russkaya 
Germaniya 2014b), the paper comes up with the following statement: 
Dear friends, we are neither for the Reds, nor for the Whites. We are not on side of emotions, 
we are not for division, but for the unification instead. […] Of course, many people here 
associate us with Russia. For many years, they were jealous because of its richness, its 
successes in economy and sport. Now someone might reproach us with Russian military and 
political activities of the latter days. But those compliments reproaches are not for us. It is a 
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trace of a myth, of a fable, nothing more. We are people of the Russian culture, Russian-
German, European traditions. But not people of the Russian policy and Russian-German 
relations (Russkaya Germaniya 2014a). 
This quotation uncovers the dichotomy that, from my point of view, plays a key role in the 
identification process of Russophones in Germany – the one of culture vs. politics. The journalists of 
Russkaya Germaniya actively try to reinforce the ‘cultural’ ties between the Russophones: thus, most 
of the instruments they apply, correspond to the scheme described by Laclau & Mouffe. Comparisons 
here (the Reds and the Whites to describe the conflicting sides) are used to establish the unity and 
stigmatize the ‘civil war’ among the Russophones in Germany provoked by the Ukrainian events. 
Constructing the dichotomy of ‘emotions-facts’ (where being emotional has negative connotations), 
the paper makes its contribution into supervising the internal discipline. Furthermore, it works to 
constitute a ‘we-ness’ that is both divided from Russia and vaguely described “some people” who 
perceive the representatives of the group as Russians. At the same time, these are different types of 
othering. Whereas connections with Russia are emotionally denied through the nomination ‘fable’ 
(which makes Russophones a subject of decision-making), the German 'they' is given a privilege of 
defining what is cultural and what is political. It means that the subjectivity belongs to a transcendental 
actor whom the group is not similar to, but wants to join. 
This shift of focus reproduces one of the most typical patterns characterizing the German media. Thus, 
along with the above-mentioned attempts to tell the story of multidirectional Russian aggression, most 
German mass media tie the political orientation of the group with the issue of integration. Thus, being 
prone to ‘Russian disinformation’ is interpreted as a sign of non-effective integration. The 
representatives of the group seem to discern this signal: not without reason does Die Einheit the first 
Spätaussiedler political party, that actively criticizes the German policy in Ukraine in Russophonic 
social spaces (e.g. PolitWera 2016) and reproduces the narratives typical for Russian media (e.g. 
D'yakonov 2017, Rempel 2017a), come up in the German space with a program that bypasses those 
issues (Die Einheit 2017).  
Russophones seem to perceive the concept of integration (without strict reference to their own story) 
as a positive one: thus, the ‘Einheit’ members emphasize the need to organize obligatory integration 
courses for new-comers (ibidem). In this case, the party is using the anti-immigrant (anti-refugee, anti-
Muslim) rhetoric quite popular among the Russophones in Germany. However, they might also judge 
other Russophones through the lens of integration. While conducting the interviews, I found out that 
Russian-speaking students and young specialists often participate in shaming (i.e. accusing of 
improper behavior, denying the right to belong to 'we' collective) 'non-integrating' representatives of 
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their linguistic community. A vague concept of what integration implies was (re)produced by Valeriya 
(25, Russophone from Ukraine): 
Many of the Russophonic immigrants don't try to get integrated into the environment, although 
they are Europeans and Christians (most of them)... I mean, that they try to have contacts 
within their own company [...] although they often speak German [...] they often date and 
marry people coming from Russophonic states. There are, of course, Russian shops, Russian 
discos that they attend. I don't think it's negative, but if they had come to Germany, they 
should've got integrated. 
Telling about the groups within the Russophonic community, Victor (25, Russophone from Ukraine) 
openly divided them into 'good' and 'bad' subgroups depending on their ability to get integrated: 
People like me, who came to study and work, are often good integrated. They sometimes speak 
German almost without an accent, and it is difficult to distinguish them from Germans. Another 
cluster [embraces] young women who came to get married. They have difficulties integrating, 
as they often speak German at the minimum level. [...] They are often the least integrated. 
This kind of shaming is quite similar to what was previously defined as 'internal supervision'. The 
‘supervisors’ consider being ‘integrated’ a positive characteristic, where the integration is expected to 
satisfy the receiving society, and the borders of what integration implies are unclear and defined by the 
latter. Bringing this concept in line with the above-mentioned dichotomy of cultural vs. political 
identification, we might interpret integration as “keeping the (situationally) correct level of cultural 
and political identification”. In this sense, a receiving society usually requires full renunciation of 
political identification with the country of origin, while the permissible cultural identification (as well 
as the understanding of what can be called culture) are regulated by social contexts. 
The set of interviews has demonstrated an interesting tendency among the representatives of the group: 
whereas those who came to Germany in the early 1990s tend to define their identification within the 
framework of ‘Russia-German’ dichotomy, migrants of further waves tend to name other types of 
identification (e.g. ‘European’) or even have difficulties to define one. Although this tendency is still 
to be confirmed by wider interview material, it can be assumed that the changing patterns correlate 
with the development of integration processes in Europe. In this case, similarly to the above mentioned 
‘Ukrainianness’, ‘Europeanness’ is understood as a political, a choice of modernity instead of classical 
‘nation-state’ identification. 
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What, however, unites different groups of Russophones in Germany, is a general skepticism towards 
media discourses. In this sense, the group demonstrates results different from the nation-wide statistics. 
According to the 2014 Zeit research, 47% of the German respondents believed that the mass media 
represent political events in a one-sided manner (http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2014-
12/umfrage-medien-russland-putin-kriegsgefahr). On the contrary, almost 100% of the Russophonic 
respondents whom I contacted with between 2016 and early 2017 expressed doubts on whether mass 
media can be trusted. A typical position thereon was formulated by Irina (23, Russophonic student): 
"The more languages you know – the more news you can read. To tell the truth, I don't trust 
news, as they only give 10% of information. Other things are only said to make people trust 
[something] that is beneficial. [...] Mass media work to portray themselves in the most 
favorable light and help the state." 
Paradoxically, even those who take a definitely pro-Russian stance accuse Russophonic media of 
exaggerations. For instance, interviewee Elena (36, Jewish Russophone) who reproduced the main 
narratives of the Russian mainstream media (e.g. the Nazi character of the Ukrainian government) and 
even accused Putin of not sending forces to ‘protect’ Eastern Ukraine, expressed surprising skepticism 
on Russian mass communication: 
“Ukrainian, Russian and German mass media represent information differently – depending on 
what is beneficial to them. […] Ukrainian media garble [all the facts]. German media can be 
trusted a bit more. And Russian media exaggerate it a little bit.” 
Against such background, Russophones tend to represent themselves as the most critical citizens who 
have access both to alternative points of view represented in Russian media and stories of eye-witness 
(relatives and friends who stayed in Ukraine). What, however, is even more important, is a general 
feeling of disappointment that seems to dominate among older migrants. “Yes, we watch news from 
both sides, we understand it all – but who needs our understanding?” – told me one of the respondents, 
47-year-old Nikolaj. So, it can be argued that Russophones feel that their opinions are marginalized 
and their access to the ‘truth’ is stigmatized within the society they live in. In this sense, the Ukrainian 
crisis can hardly be called a point that induced this understanding, but it definitely marked one of the 
most prominent peaks in the process. 
After living years within the system that denies a possibility of immigrants’ civic ties with the country 
of origin, the representatives of the group have a full potential of being integrated into the normal 
political system of the receiving society. However, such a step requires that no massive attacks on their 
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cultural identification and specific views are undertaken. The refusal of the German society to follow 
this track has led to the transformation of the most marginalized part of the group (above all, first-wave 
immigrants who failed to get rid of the characteristics sensed as Russian) into the potential electorate 
of the right-wing forces. 
Although right-wing media indicate relatively low support from the side of Russophones (Junge 
Freiheit 2016) and some points of the Alternative für Deutschland program might contradict the 
interests of the group12, there are several points that make the connection of the Russophonic 
community with the right forces a topic to pay attention to. To begin with, the AfD made the most 
successful attempt in the 2010s to directly refer to the representatives of the group. Thus, the party 
came up with a Russian translation of its program (Alternative für Deutschland / Brandenburg 2014) 
and nominated candidates who speak good Russian (Sputnik 2017). Secondly, an analysis of the 
group’s online communities demonstrates that most politically oriented organizations of Russophones 
formed within recent years are either associated with the party, or share similar understandings (e.g.  
Russlanddeutsche für AfD; Vertriebene, Aussiedler und deutsche Minderheiten in der AfD; 
Russlanddeutsche Front; to a certain extent – die Einheit). Those communities that try to 'pacify' the 
group (see more at: Der Tagesspiegel 2016) and protect it from being "used by external forces" (e.g. 
'Vision' in Marzahn or 'Lyra' in Lichtenberg) enjoy far less support among Russophones. Furthermore, 
the fact that they formulate their aims in terms of integration, but exclude the ‘political’ side thereof 
might play against them in the changing situation. 
The character of the AfD itself should also be mentioned. Thus, a party can be evaluated as a populist 
force in Laclau’s terminology, inasmuch as it tries to attract voters by uniting a plurality of unsatisfied 
individual demands under an umbrella of ‘empty’ rhetoric – primarily, anti-immigration one. In a 
normal political climate, the protests against the incumbent government’s immigration policy with a 
high probability wouldn’t have gained such a great importance. However, the imposition of a 
discursive taboo on anti-immigration opinions13 has led to the transformation of such statements into a 
perfect ‘empty signifier’. The use of populist rhetoric attracts marginalized forces whose attempts to 
make their opinions heard generally failed within the ‘normal’ pollical spectrum – and the silent part of 
the Russophonic community might become one of them. 
                                                          
12 For instance, the far-right party supports the concept of Leitkultur ('dominating culture') instead of multiculturalism, i.e. 
insists on assimilation practices vis-à-vis new-comers (see more: https://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-
content/uploads/sites/111/2017/01/2016-06-20_afd-kurzfassung_grundsatzprogramm_webversion.pdf) 
13 Thus, anti-immigration forces are often accused of promoting racism and fascism (e.g. 
http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2015-01/pegida-rassismus-einwanderung-rente-fachkraeftemangel) 
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After bringing in a thesis of the group’s growing right-wing preferences, I would like to once again 
emphasize: the Ukrainian conflict was not a trigger that induced this tendency, but it has definitely 
accelerated the process.  What that makes the Ukrainian conflict a special case is the two-layered 
character of its representations in both German and Russophonic mass communication. The first – and 
the less developed – layer describes this conflict as a limited regional confrontation. At this stage, 
humanitarian issues and local dynamics are paid attention to; the ‘we-ness’ formulated through such 
discourses deals with a role of a detached observer. However, there’s also the second layer that 
represents the conflict as a manifestation of a global clash between two ‘we-communities’ that the 
Russophones might belong to: Russia and the West.  
As it was stated previously (see: Russophones in Germany: between 1990s and 2014), for the last 
twenty five years the German society has been conducting a step-be-step offensive on the 
identification of the Russophonic group. The space of ‘cultural’ identification has been shrinking 
through the extension of the ‘political’ sphere. The latter was stigmatized through the concept of ‘non-
integration’ that was (re)produced by both intra- and extra-group actors. The dominance of the 
Ukrainian conflict’s representations that constitute a notion of a global clash, has led to the articulation 
of the two-decades-long pressures directed against the Russophones in Germany. Nowadays the 
question of whether they should be treated as an internal threat is raised.  
In a situation when the Russian discourses are often based on historical references, this type of 
experiences is further politicized. In 2015 Körber (2015 : 25) wrote: "The arrival of Russophonic Jews 
has changed the collective memory of the group, as [the Russophones] see the Great Patriotic war as 
its center, not the Holocaust". Indeed, the interviewees whom I worked with, indicated that historical 
experiences constitute an important part of their identities. Thus, Elena (36, Jewish Russophone) 
claimed that Russianness is about “celebrating May, 914 and February, 2315”, while Sofiya (27, 
Russophonic wife of a German citizen) emphasized the importance of patriotic emotions condensed 
around the figure of Juri Gagarin, the first cosmonaut to fly into outer space. 
At the same time, the discourses concentrating on history seem to have failed the task of creating a 
stable transnational community. The initial tide of historical debates in Russophonic social spaces 
began to abate. Signs of dissatisfaction with the dominance of historical discourses can be traced in 
Russian internal spaces, too (cf. Dolya 2017). Outside the Russian territory, the potential of such 
narratives is seriously challenged by the need to deal with societies with other dominant discourses. 
                                                          
14 Victory Day, a holiday devoted to the victory of the Soviet Union over Nazi Germany in the Great Patriotic War. 
15 Defender of the Fatherland Day, a holiday celebrated in several post-Soviet countries. It was first celebrated during the 
Russian Civil War and was initially devoted to the establishment of the Red Army. Nowadays is often referred to as the 
"Men's Day" 
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Thus, the ‘orientation in the past’ gives the former compatriots no clear hopes for their future lives, 
which most of them intend to connect with Germany. In this sense, the far-right discourses that 
combine abstract ideas of truth-seeking with current political issues have a greater potential. 
The above-mentioned disillusionment on the attempts to make their views heard, is further poisoned 
by intra-group conflicts among Russophones in Germany. Although the Russian representations of the 
Ukrainian conflict have given an impact to the discursive unification of the group (thus, in 2014-2015 
the reproduction of Russian media narratives was especially active in the corresponding social spaces), 
the internal disagreements prevented a stable community from being established. The Jewish 
respondents whom I worked with, often accused Russlanddeutsche of being “uneducated” and not 
critical enough towards what mass media say. On the other hand, at least one of the interviewed 
repatriates expressed her annoyance over Jews’ attempts to “repeat everything that the Germans want 
them to”. 
5.4 Discussion 
One of the major features that define the place of the current research among other studies consists in 
its cross-group character. By bringing in the discursive background, I demonstrated that different 
groups of Russophones face similar issues. At the same time, my study was not structured as a 
comparative one (as it was made by Baerwolf, 2006; Kurennoi, 2005 or Verschinin, 2011). The 
decision to take several subgroups into consideration was primarily based on my presupposition that 
the hegemonic intervention undertaken by the Russian side, might have led to unification tendencies 
among the representatives of the group – which has only proved to be partly true. 
Throughout the research, it has become clear that the concept of integration does function as one of the 
nominators structuring the identification processes among the Russophones in Germany. However, my 
interpretation of this concept differs from the perception of Savoskul (2006) who argues that one's 
ability to build into the receiving society objectively predefines the person's identification. Thus, I 
argue that the integration is not an objective characteristic, but a socially constructed dividing line 
between the 'socially accepted' behavior of immigrants and the ‘reproached' one. In other words, I try 
to break the ‘good/bad immigrant' dichotomy that is both implicitly present in sociopolitical 
communications and in some research (e.g. by Savoskul 2006, Kiehl 2009). Following this track, I 
demonstrated how this stigmatization might influence the Russophones’ identification and political 
choices, thereby adding the conclusions made by Münz & Ohliger (2004) and Zinn-Thomas (2006).   
My research also makes an indirect contribution to the Esser-Elwert debates on Binnenintegration 
(internal integration). I claim that being denied normal civic participation pushes the group to the edge 
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of political spectrum – a position that is somehow consonant to the arguments of Georg Elwert (1982) 
who emphasized the positive influence of migrants' own organizations on their adaption in the 
receiving society. By adapting Laclau and Mouffe’s thesis that both the logic of equivalence and the 
logic of difference work for identity construction, I emphasize the potential of far-right forces in 
attracting the unsatisfied individual demands under the ‘umbrella’ of empty slogans. It means that, 
despite the difference between some AfD rhetoric and the demands of the group, such forces still can 
count on the group’s support. However, my reference to this topic shouldn’t be perceived as a final 
conclusion – what I do instead is outlining the prospects for future research that might deal with a 
rather understudied topic of the political preferences of Russophones in Germany. 
As for the media aspects of my research, the current thesis can be evaluated as an attempt to bring in 
the textuality into the immigrants’ media studies. Thus, I tried to make a step from the classical 
‘assimilation-pluralism’ paradigm dominating within ethnic media research (Oh 2016 : 264-266) to the 
poststructuralist understandings of the mass media roles. Following the ideas of Chantal Mouffe, I 
regard mass media as one of the main fields where hegemony is created and reproduced, but also can 
be challenged (Carpentier & Cammaerts 2006 : 969). No specific characteristics of individual mass 
media were given, which differs my research from the previous studies (e.g. Smolyarova 2012, 
Kurennoi 2005). Furthermore, my reference to the Ukrainian crisis is only by the task of analyzing the 
identification tendencies that are context-bound and cannot be studied without a strictly defined 
framework. To a certain extent, this choice functioned as ‘updating’ the previous research in the view 
of the latest tendencies. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
The specific patterns of representing the Ukrainian crisis that are characteristic of German mainstream 
media, on the one hand, and Russian mainstream media, on the other hand, have created a situation, 
when the Russophones in Germany found themselves stuck between two conflicting discursive 
formations. The current thesis set an aim of finding out the influence exerted by the Ukrainian events 
on the group’s identification processes. 
The analysis has demonstrated that both the German and Russian mass communication discourses 
represent the conflict though a two-layered model. The first – and the less developed – layer describes 
this conflict as a limited regional confrontation. At this stage, humanitarian issues and local dynamics 
are paid attention to; the ‘we-ness’ formulated through such discourses deals with a role of a detached 
observer. The second one represents the conflict as a manifestation of a global clash between two ‘we-
communities’ that the Russophones might belong to: Russia and the West. Within the second layer, the 
German mainstream media spaces are dominated by the notion of ‘attacking Russia’, where the 
Ukrainian events are represented as a part of a general Kremlin’s aggression carried out on multiple 
fronts. Whenever openly referred to, Russophones in Germany are represented as Kremlin’s (potential) 
allies, who consciously avoided being integrated and now gravitate towards destructive forces 
supported by Moscow.  
For their part, Russian media draw a picture of ‘aggressive West’ that disrespects Russia’s interests 
and challenges its diverging choices. In an attempt to resist this pressure, Russian mainstream social 
communications refer to an indefinite group of ‘justice-seekers’ that also includes former compatriots. 
This appeal is supported by multiple references to historical events – especially those connected with 
World War II. Therefore, the community that they try to construct, acquires a strong orientation into 
the past, but gives the former compatriots no clear hopes for their future lives, which most of them 
intend to connect with Germany. 
Although during the first two years of the crisis Russophonic social media actively reproduced 
dominant Russian narratives, 2016 observed a general decline in this type of behavior. Such a 
tendency can be explained by both the limited importance of the conflict for those who permanently 
live in Germany, and the general feeling of marginalization experienced by the representatives of the 
group. Thus, after being included into the unity of the ‘truth-seekers’ promoted by the Russian media, 
the Russophones in Germany stay isolated within the community of distant like-minded people. 
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The roots of the group’s marginalization within the German society can be found in the early 1990s. 
Those years, negative representations of Russlanddeutsche and Russophonic Jews – two main 
subgroups of the Russophones – became dominant. Whereas the Spätaussiedler (repatriates) were 
shamed for their failure to get assimilated, Russophonic Jews got accused of forging documents that 
affirm their Jewish descent. Despite the formal nominations, both groups were recurrently referred to 
as ‘Russians’ in their everyday lives. In this sense, ‘Russianness’ was socially constructed as a 
negative characteristic that should be got rid of through the process of ‘integration’. This attack on the 
specific identification of the group is referred by me through the dichotomy of ‘cultural vs. political’. 
Thus, I argue that the receiving society stigmatized the political identification with the country of 
origin and gradually limited the sphere of permissible cultural identification. To a certain extent, this 
process was strengthened by ‘internal supervision’, i.e. the intra-group actors who work to establish 
discipline within the community. 
The groups’ wish to follow public expectations restrained its organizational activities. Most 
organizations formed to defend the interests of the group members had to radically adapt their claims 
to the interests of the receiving society – therefore, a feeling of being unheard was growing among the 
Russophones. It has become clear throughout the thesis that the Ukrainian conflict was not a trigger 
that induced this tendency, but it has definitely accelerated the process. Being marginalized within the 
‘normal’ political spectrum pushes the group towards far-right forces that present themselves as 
outsiders and base their programs on populist rhetoric. Although the current statistic (Junge Freiheit 
2016) indicates that the support of the far-right party Alternative für Deutschland among Russophones 
is quite limited, the tendency should not be underestimated. 
Answering the question of whether the representations of the Ukrainian conflict have led to the 
formation of a stable community, I have to state that it has not happened. The second option mentioned 
in my key research question turned out to be more realistic: despite the initial signs of (limited) 
unification, the group is currently facing growing internal divisions. One of the most remarkable splits 
can be observed between the Russophonic community in general and those Russophonic Ukrainians 
who supported Kiev’s policy. New concept of 'Ukrainianness' was formulated through othering 
'Russianness', 'Sovietness' or 'non-Westerness', where the latter were understood as the opposition to 
modernization. Furthermore, the conflict has further deepened the years-long internal splits between 
Russlanddeutsche and Russophonic Jews. 
The research implies several directions to be developed in. Thus, it can grow into a broader 
comparative study that takes into consideration diverse social groups within the German society (e.g. 
Russophones and Turks; Russophones and people with no migration experience). However, this kind 
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research would require a specific discursive framework that should be associated with a case having 
utmost importance for both groups. Such a case might allegedly deal with the refugee issue that was 
recurrently mentioned by the respondents as influencing their identification. A different research track 
might be connected with the focus on far-right forces, the chains of equivalence that they construct and 
the unsatisfied groups that they work with. Both options have an immense potential as a basis of 
political strategies’ elaboration, which can be used by both the governmental and foreign actors for 
their own aims. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1  
Interview questions16 
1. Name (preferred pseudonym); 
2. Age; 
3. Occupation; 
4. Education level; 
5. Term of living in Germany; 
6. Citizenship. 
7. How often have you inquired about the Ukrainian events? 
8. Which source(s) have you used to get information on the Ukrainian crisis?  
9. Which mass media can be described as your main sources of information on the Ukrainian crisis? How can 
you describe the point of view reflected in these mass media? 
10. Have you familiarized yourself with the alternative points of view on the Ukrainian crisis? Which sources of 
information have you used? How would you comment on their approaches? 
11. How can you evaluate the recent policy of the Russian Federation in Ukraine? How do you evaluate the 
Crimean events? How do you personally evaluate the Euromaidan events? (in your own words) 
12. Which side, from your point of view, bears the responsibility for unleashing the armed conflict in Eastern 
Ukraine? (in your own words) 
13. Do you believe that Russian troops are/used to be present in Eastern Ukraine? If yes, how do you personally 
evaluate it? 
14. How would you describe yourself? (e.g. Russian, German, Russlanddeutsche, Jew etc.) You may use 
several characteristics at a time.  
15. If the respondent has described himself/herself as a «Russian»: what, from your point of view, being 
Russian is about?  
16. Which groups do you mostly contact in your free time? 
17. How would you characterize Russophones in Germany? 
18. Which influence have the Ukrainian events exerted on your perception of Russia?  
19. Have you faced situations since 2014, when you felt uncomfortable speaking Russian or telling someone 
you are Russian/you come from Russia? If yes, describe those situations. 
 
 
Appendix 2 
                                                          
16 These are the key questions; their order and formulation might have varied. In some cases, not all the questions were 
asked 
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Respondents’ general characteristic 
 
Name Age Formal category 
Larisa 46 Jewish Russophone 
Valeriya 25 other Russophones; comes from Ukraine 
Irina 23 other Russophones 
Petr N/A other Russophones; comes from Ukraine 
Ekaterina 23 Jewish Russophone 
Sofiya 27 other Russophones 
Dmitrij N/A Jewish Russophone 
Victor 25 other Russophones; comes from Ukraine 
Marina 47 Russlanddeutsche 
Elena 36 Jewish Russophone 
Andrej 36 other Russophones; comes from Ukraine 
Nikolaj 47 Russlanddeutsche 
Tamara 61 Russlanddeutsche 
Mikhail 55 Russlanddeutsche 
Vadim 33 other Russophones 
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Appendix 3 
Key quotations translated from 
Russian and German (original text) 
 
Mass media quotations: 
Eugen Litwinow interview (pp. 49-50): Solange wir in Kasachstan lebten, war mir nicht bewusst, 
dass meine Mutter deutsche Wurzeln hat. Als die UdSSR zusammenbrach und Kasachisch als 
Hauptsprache eingeführt werden sollte, sagten meine Eltern: Hier wollen wir nicht bleiben. Sie standen 
vor der Wahl: Entweder den Wurzeln meines Vaters nach Russland folgen oder eben denen meiner 
Mutter. (Mediendienst Integration 2014) 
Georg Schmalz interview (p. 50): Moi predki vyekhali iz goroda nem. Wiesenburg / fr. Wissembourg 
(sejchas Frantsiya) na Ukrainu v selo Landau primerno v 1840 godu — gde i prozhili do prihoda 
kommunistov k vlasti. Posle raskulachivaniya i rasstrelov moih pradedov, sem'i i rodstvenniki byli 
razbrosany po vsemu sovetskomu gosudarstvu. [...] Nemetskomu yazyku menya nauchila babushka, do 
shkoly ya razgovarival na nemetskom v sem'e. Priekhav v Germaniyu, ya ponyal chto babushkin yazyk 
ostalsya na urovne 19 veka. [...] Ya sebya schitayu nemtsem — hotya nas nazyvayut russkimi 
nemtsami v Germanii. (Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei 2008) 
Tamara Barabasch interview (p. 50): Die Leute, erzählt sie, hören meinen Namen, den Akzent, und 
sagen: Ach so, Sie sind Russin. [...] Wir dachten, wir kehren in die Heimat zurück und bleiben die 
Fremden. (Thüringer Allgemeine 2016) 
FOCUS online article (p. 57): „Mir wurde klar, dass die Sowjetunion erkrankt ist. An einer tödlichen, 
unheilbaren Krankheit. Der Lähmung der Macht.“ Seit 14 Jahren versucht Putin alles, um diese 
Lähmung zu überwinden. Aber nicht im Sinne des Westens: Nicht den Mangel an Freiheit, Demokratie 
und Transparenz hält er für den größten Fehler der Sowjetunion - sondern dass Reformer Michail 
Gorbatschow das Regime der KPdSU gelockert hat. Demonstrationen, Aufruhr - sie haben damals in 
der DDR seine Welt zerstört. Und jetzt kamen sie wieder. In Kiew. Auf dem Majdan. (Reitschuster 
2014) 
Bild article (p. 58): Weil diese stillen Männer nie laut werden, weil sie in sanftem Ton von 
Brüderlichkeit und Frieden sprechen, weil sie – wie schon andere Diktatoren vor ihnen – immer, nur 
noch ein letztes Mal‘ territoriale Ansprüche erheben, fallen einige unter uns auf ihre Worte herein und 
finden sich mit ihrem aggressiven Treiben ab. (Reichelt 2017) 
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Bild article (p. 58): Der Moderator, dem Millionen Russen wöchentlich zuschauen, kommt zu dem 
Schluss: Merkel habe mit ihrer pro-amerikanischen und russland-feindlichen Politik „die Politik ihrer 
hervorragenden Vorgänger“ [...]  „zerstört“. Denn im Gegensatz zu ihnen erkenne Angela Merkel nicht 
mehr, dass „ohne Russlands Wohlwollen weder ein vereintes Deutschland noch ein vereintes Europa 
gebaut werden kann“. (Röpcke 2017b) 
Spiegel online article (p. 60): Wenn dort steht, von einer bestimmten Position sei "outgoing fire" 
registriert worden, dann ist klar, welche Seite schießt. Weitaus schwieriger ist es jedoch, zu benennen, 
wer im konkreten Fall die Schuld für die Eskalation trägt. Ein Schuss kann auch ein Abwehrmanöver 
sein [...]. In 90 Prozent der Fälle sind es die Separatisten, die uns behindern. Wir haben etwa große 
Probleme, an die russisch-ukrainische Grenze zu kommen. Das kann nur eines bedeuten: Es gibt dort 
etwas, das die Separatisten verbergen. (Gathmann 2016) 
ZDF program (p. 63): ...uns, dem Publikum, den Zeitungslesern, den Fernsehzuschauern ein 
Schwarzweißfilm vorgeführt wird, in dem alles was am negativen passiert, Herr Putin angelastet wird. 
Der Realität ist aber kein Schwarzweißfilm. Wir, der Westen, haben hier auch Interessen. Es wird 
immer so getan, als ob wir nur Demokratie, Freiheit und Menschenrechte auf der Fahne stehen hätten, 
und Putin will nur sein Reich expandieren, ist aggressiv, will Krieg und so... Das entspricht nicht der 
Realität. (ZDF 2014b) 
Junge Freiheit article (p. 64): Aus westlich-amerikanischer Sicht trägt Rußland die Alleinschuld an 
der Eskalation des Ukraine-Konflikts zum unerklärten Krieg, aus russischer Sicht „der Westen“, 
genauer [...]. Hundert Jahre nach Ausbruch des Ersten Weltkriegs sollte sich indes herumgesprochen 
haben, daß es in Kriegen selten Alleinschuldige gibt, daß konkurrierende Mächte aber um so leichter 
aus einem lokalen Konflikt in eine umfassende Auseinandersetzung schlittern, je fester ihre politischen 
und militärischen Eliten davon überzeugt sind, nur ihr gutes Recht zu wahren und „alternativlos“ das 
Richtige zu tun. (Paulwitz 2014) 
Pervyi kanal program (p. 67): V Rossii dazhe v hudshie vremena 90-h gosudarstvo sushchestvovalo, 
kak nekaya samotsennaya sushchnost', i nashi oligarhi pozitsionirovalis' otnositel'no gosudarstva. Na 
Ukraine nikakogo gosudarstva, pomimo ehtih oligarhov, ne bylo. (Pervyi kanal 2015a) 
Rossiya 1 program (p. 68): Trageliya Ukraina sostoit ne tol'ko v ee geopoliticheskom i duhovnom 
krahe, segodnya ona fakticheski upravlyaetsya vneshnimi silami. <v pravitel'stve> net tekh, kto 
prinimaet resheniya nezavisimo (Rojkov 2014) 
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RT article (p. 72): Dazhe posle raspada SSSR neofitsial'noe protivostoyanie «Vostok-Zapad» nikogda 
ne perestavalo byt' aktual'nym. Sovsem nedavno ehto protivostoyanie stalo ochevidnym - v svyazi s 
situatsiej, slozhivshejsya na Ukraine, NATO vnov' vzyalsya za ritoriku, kotoruyu v svoyo vremya 
pervyj general'nyj sekretar' al'yansa Gastings Lajonel Ismej vyrazil takimi slovami: «…uderzhivat' 
russkih v storone, amerikantsev vnutri, a nemtsev pod». [...] v pervuyu ochered' NATO – ehto 
voennaya organizatsiya zapadnoj tsivilizatsii. (RT 2014) 
Russkaya Germaniya article (p. 78): Druz'ya-chitateli, my – ne za «krasnyh» i ne za «belyh». My – 
ne na storone ehmotsij, ne za razdelenie, a za edinenie. [...] Konechno, mnogie zdes' assotsiiruyut nas s 
Rossiej. Dolgie gody revnovali k eyo bogatstvu, ehkonomicheskim i sportivnym uspekham. Teper', 
vozmozhno, kto-to i popreknyot kogo-to rossijskoj voenno-politicheskoj aktivnost'yu poslednih dnej. 
No ehti komplimenty i upryoki – ne k nam. EHto sled mifa, narodnoj legendy, ne bolee togo. Ne stoit 
ni uteshat'sya imi, ni ih opasat'sya. My – lyudi russkoj kul'tury, rossijsko-nemetskih, evropejskih 
traditsij. No nikak ne rossijskoj politiki i nikak ne germano-rossijskih otnoshenij.  (Russkaya 
Germaniya 2014a) 
Interview materials: 
Andrej (p. 74): Est' russkie v Germanii ochen' horoshie lyudi, a est' chto chuvstvuetsya smotrit odin 
kanal i dlya nego my, ukraintsy, nepravil'no delaem, chto pytaemsya skinut' korruptsionnuyu vlast' 
Victor (p. 74): Kogda ya byl studentom, so mnoj uchilsya paren', no ne v moej gruppe, na god 
mladshe... On voobshche izbegal obshchat'sya s temi, kto iz Rossii - v tom chisle so mnoj i eshche 
odnim parnem iz Donetska. Ya dumayu, ehto bylo svyazano s politikoj, potomu chto, kogda my potom 
nachali obshchat'sya, on takie...antirossijskie vzglyady vyskazyval. 
Marina (p. 77): Ya znayu, chto russkoyazychnye tut boyatsya, potomu chto esli informatsiya vsplyvet, 
to ne smozhesh' rabotu najti. 
Valeriya (p. 80): Mnogie russkoyazychnye immigranty ne pytayutsya integrirovat'sya v sredu, hotya 
oni evropejtsy i hristiane... Nu, bol'shinstvo iz nih. YA k tomu, chto oni starayutsya obshchat'sya tol'ko 
svoej kompaniej [...] hotya ona chasto govoryat po-nemetski [...] chasto vstrechayutsya i zhenyatsya na 
lyudyah iz russkoyazychnyh stran. YA ne dumayu, chto ehto negativno, no raz uzh oni priekhali v 
Germaniyu - nado integrirovat'sya. 
Victor (p. 81): Lyudi vrode menya, kotorye syuda priekhali rabotat' i uchit'sya, obychno horosho 
integrirovany. Oni inogda po-nemetski govoryat pochti bez aktsenta, ih dazhe ot nemtsev slozhno 
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otlichit'. Eshche est' gruppa molodyh devushek, kotorye syuda priekhali zamuzh. Oni ploho 
integriruyutsya, nemetskij u nih minimal'nyj [...]. Oni chasto naimenee integrirovany. 
Irina (p. 82): Chem bol'she yazykov ty znaesh' - tem bol'she novostej mozhesh' prochitat'. Esli 
chestno, ya ne ochen' veryu novostyam, oni govoryat tol'ko protsentov 10 informatsii. Ostal'noe 
govoryat, tol'ko chtoby lyudi poverili v to, chto im vygodno. [...] SMI starayutsya predstavit' sebya v 
luchshem svete i pomoch' gosudarstvu. 
Elena (p. 82): Ukrainskie, rossijskie, nemetskie SMI po-raznomu vse predstavlyayut - chto im 
vygodno [...]. Ukrainskie vse fakty perevirayut, nemetskim nemnozhko bol'she doveriya. A russkie 
nemnozhko preuvelichivayut. 
Quotations from social media17: 
Olga (p. 76): Slava Ukraine! Geroyam Slava! YA rodilas' na Poltavshchine [...]. Sejchas zhivu v 
Germanii, pochti 20 let zhivu i oplakivayu stranu svoyu , glyadya na neyo so storony. Kogda ya 
uezzhala v ehti lihie 90 -tye my vse boyalis' rot otkryt'… stoya v ocheredyah za saharom i maslom. 
Nas travili militsionery, doili reketiry na bazarah. Za 20 let ne izmenilos' nichego! Vsyo stalo dorozhe i 
strashnej v 20 raz! U vas zamylilsya glaz, vy ne videte v kakom [...] zhivyote… kakomu [...] 
podchinyaetes'! (Schapovalova 2014) 
Anonymous (p. 76-77): Moj brat rodilsya v SSSR, a ya rodilsya v Ukraine, i zhili my v Ukraine, a 
potom prishli kakie to lyudi i govoryat "tut bol'she ne Ukraina, a LNR", i ya dolzhen idti voevat' za 
LNR, a zavtra pridut belye i skazhut tut ne LNR, a territoriya belyh, posle nih pridut krasnye, potom 
zelenye... I chto, za kazhdogo voevat'? [...] EHto ehmigratsionnoe bydlo, kotoromu dali vozmozhnost' 
syuda priekhat', i oni vozomnili iz sebya arijtsev. Da takie zhe vy bezhentsy, tol'ko bolee po lajtu 
syuda vorvalis', s bOl'shim kolichestvom prav. Tak chto, ne zabyvajte kto vy i otkuda. Prosto smeshno 
chitat'. A kogda v nemetskih nalogoplatel'shchikah prosypayutsya russkie patrioty, u menya prosto 
isterika. (Podlushano Germaniya 2016a) 
Nataliya (p. 76-77): Ehta gruppa dlya russkogovoryashchih v Germanii...A ehtot tip vlez syuda so 
svoim rolikom, chtoby rastravit' narod opyat'! 
Pavel (p. 78): Russkomu naseleniyu v Germanii gluboko po barabanu, chto tam za konfilkty v 
Ukraine, Kenii ili na Al'fa Tsentavre. 
                                                          
17 The spelling is corrected in several cases 
